Too Conflicted to be Transparent: Giving Affordable Financing its  ‘Good Name’ Back by Jones Havard, Cassandra
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
2017
Too Conflicted to be Transparent: Giving
Affordable Financing its ‘Good Name’ Back
Cassandra Jones Havard
Univ of Baltimore, chavard@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cassandra Jones Havard, Too Conflicted to be Transparent: Giving Affordable Financing its ‘Good Name’ Back, 30 Legislation and Public
Policy 451 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac/1059
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-2\NYL203.txt unknown Seq: 1 7-SEP-17 14:55
TOO CONFLICTED TO BE
TRANSPARENT: GIVING AFFORDABLE
FINANCING ITS ‘GOOD NAME’ BACK
Cassandra Jones Havard*
Securitization, the process of pooling loans for re-sale on the secon-
dary market, is an important part of mortgage financing. It creates more
capital for mortgages and makes home pricing affordable, which is benefi-
cial to borrowers. The subprime crisis exposed intrinsic structural flaws in
the mortgage securitization process. Chief among them is the “issuer-pays”
model of credit ratings. Issuers, who bundle loans for sale on the securities
market, are required to have an independent analysis from a credit rating
agency or a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NR-
SRO) prior to the sale of the securities to investors. This rating is not only a
certification of the creditworthiness of the securities, but also a signal to
investors that the securities will perform as predicted. Prior to the subprime
crisis, the ratings provided for subprime loans were inflated, causing inves-
tors, who relied on the ratings, to leave the private-label mortgage market.
Restoring confidence in this market is critical to having robust, sustainable
mortgage financing.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) made significant changes in the financial services industry
designed to protect borrowers and investors. Although the amended law
required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to assume more
authority over credit rating agencies, the SEC did not abandon the issuer-
pays model of credit ratings. This Article fills a void in credit rating agency
reform. It proposes that credit rating agencies independently verify and sub-
stantiate the information provided by issuers to ensure the accuracy of the
information inputted into the business models they use. Rules tightening
loan quality standards are now in place, but independent review of the qual-
ity of loan manufacturing remains elusive. This Article also argues that bor-
rowers, who have a vested interest in both a sustainable mortgage and an
unbiased, fair, transparent rating, are indirect beneficiaries of the rating
process. Regulating the market by requiring credit rating agencies to con-
duct due diligence incorporates quality standards into the ratings process
and deters abuse. Given the failure of the credit rating agency reforms to
address the inherent structural flaw in the current model, this Article argues
the proposal will ensure the needed accountability, transparency, and over-
sight that can better protect borrowers and investors.
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INTRODUCTION
Securitization, the process of pooling loans for re-sale on the sec-
ondary market, is an important part of mortgage financing.1 It creates
1. Structured finance, a highly complex financial transaction, makes illiquid assets
liquid, freeing up capital on the originating lender’s balance sheet. Firms use the prod-
ucts when a conventional financial product, such as a loan, will not meet the firm’s
financing needs. Structured finance products have been a major segment in the finan-
cial industry since the mid-1980s. Examples of structured finance products include
collateralized bond obligations (CBOs), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), syndi-
cated loans, and synthetic financial instruments. See TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZA-
TION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES § 1.1 (2d ed. 1991); see also Elizabeth Laderman, Subprime Mortgage
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more capital for mortgages and makes home pricing affordable, which
is beneficial to borrowers.2 The subprime crisis exposed intrinsic
structural flaws in the mortgage securitization process. Chief among
them is the issuer-pays model of credit ratings. Issuers, who bundle
loans for sale on the securities market, are required to have an
independent analysis from a credit rating agency or a Nationally Rec-
ognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) prior to the sale of
the securities to investors.3 This rating is not only a certification of the
creditworthiness of the securities, but also a signal to investors that the
securities should perform as predicted. Prior to the financial crisis, the
ratings provided for subprime loans were inflated, causing investors,
who relied on the ratings, to leave the private-label mortgage market.
This Article fills a void in credit rating agency reform by propos-
ing credit rating agency due diligence. Although the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), charged with the supervision of credit
rating agencies, assumed more authority over credit rating agencies
after the financial crisis, it did not abandon the issuer-pays model for
credit ratings.4 Rules tightening loan quality standards are now in
place, but independent review of loan manufacturing quality remains
elusive.5 Given the failure of the reforms to address that structural
Lending and the Capital Markets, FED. RES. BANK S.F. ECON. LETTER (Dec. 28,
2001), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2001/de
cember/subprime-mortgage-lending-and-the-capital-markets/.
2. Securitization weakens lenders’ screening incentives. See discussion infra note
93 and accompanying text; see generally Surnit Agarwal et al., Adverse Selection in
Mortgage Securitization, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 640 (2012); Nicola Cetorelli & Stavros
Peristiani, The Role of Banks in Asset Securitization, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON.
POL’Y REV. 47–63 (July 2012).
3. Issuer-pays model of credit ratings involves the issuer of the securities stock
offering paying the rating agency for the initial rating of a security, as well as ongoing
ratings. Only one of the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NR-
SRO), Egan Jones, uses the subscriber-pays model, in which investors pay for the
ratings. During the financial crisis, credit rating agencies used inaccurate modeling
and produced inflated ratings. See discussion infra Part III.
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) now requires disclosure of
models and assumptions. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
REPORT: NAVIGATING THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD 82 (2009), http://www.
imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2016/12/31/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-
flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/GFSR/2009/02/pdf/_textpdf.ashx. Specifically, the
rules require stronger conflicts of interest and governance controls and enhanced
transparency. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
CREDIT RATING STANDARDIZATION STUDY (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2012/939h_credit_rating_standardization.pdf.
5. Under SEC rules, credit rating agencies must disclose any certifications from
providers of third-party due diligence services with respect to mortgage-backed secur-
ities. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-10 (2015) (“Rule 17g-10”); id. § 249b.500 (2014)
(“Form ABS Due Diligence-15E”).
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flaw, full transparency and quality control measures are needed in
credit ratings.
These quality control measures would have been beneficial to
homeowners, such as individuals in Detroit, Michigan, who were vic-
tims of subprime loan abuse and lost their homes due to foreclosure. 6
The affected homeowners brought a lawsuit against the investment
bank Morgan Stanley, claiming that it had adopted mortgage securi-
tization policies that caused predatory lending and violated consumer
laws and African Americans’ civil rights.7 Although the court dis-
missed this class action lawsuit because the prospective class could
not be certified, the crux of the claims was that racial discrimination
precipitated the securitization of mortgage-backed securities.8 Specifi-
cally, plaintiffs alleged that New Century Mortgage Company, a now-
defunct loan originator, targeted minority neighborhoods and minority
borrowers to sell loans with unjustifiably high costs and risk of fore-
closure.9 Morgan Stanley allegedly provided the up-front funding, set
loan volume goals, established the criteria for the mortgage terms, and
thus was claimed to be responsible for the disparate impacts of New
Century’s lending practices.10
Securitization was beneficial to financial institutions, such as
New Century, because it allowed them to transfer credit risks of loans
it originated from their balance sheets to investments banks, such as
Morgan Stanley, which purchased them.11 It was initially beneficial to
homeowners like plaintiff Beverly Adkins, but eventually ruinous to
6. RONALD D. UTT, HERITAGE FOUND., The Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse:
A Primer on the Causes and Possible Solutions 13 (2008) (discussing how the lack of
transparency in the pooled mortgages makes it difficult to assess the risks).
7. See Complaint, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, 2012 WL 4856708 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 12CIV7667). New Century Mortgage Co., a non-bank mortgage company, regu-
larly made subprime loans based on questionable underwriting and then sold those
loans to investment banks and other secondary market purchasers, including Morgan
Stanley, which securitized them. The Complaint alleged that Morgan Stanley had a
significant impact on New Century’s practices, including an early funding program in
which Morgan Stanley wanted future commitments from New Century for unfunded
loans. Id. at ¶67. In July 2013, the court dismissed Morgan Stanley’s motion to deny
the discrimination claims asserted under the Fair Housing Act and granted the motion
to dismiss the claims asserted under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Michi-
gan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. See Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, 307 F.R.D. 119,
120 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
8. The class-action lawsuit sought to certify a class of all African-American home-
owners in Detroit, but certification was denied due to a lack of commonality among
the purported class. Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, 307 F.R.D. 119, 120 (2015).
9. Complaint at ¶ 55–60, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, 2012 WL 4856708.
10. See id. at ¶ 76–81.
11. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1086–1103 (1996).
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these same homeowners and neighborhoods because issuers pooled
those loans into mortgage-backed securities for investors to purchase.
Issuers systematically disregarded basic guidelines for fair lending,
purchasing loans that put borrowers at high risks of foreclosure and
incentivizing loan originators to favor predatory loans. Moreover,
credit rating agencies routinely failed to independently verify informa-
tion from issuers regarding securitized loan pools and rated the securi-
tized loans as “investment” grade when, in reality, they were of poor
quality.12
The subprime mortgage, a product established after the deregula-
tion of the financial industry in the 1980s, developed robustly between
2002 and 2006.13 It dramatically increased mortgage credit availability
to borrowers who might otherwise not have obtained a loan, albeit at a
higher interest rate.14 Mortgage securitization is unique because it
bundles as collateral small mortgage loans from diverse geographic
locations that are difficult to monitor and verify.15  Despite these hid-
den risks, subprime securitization, with its higher rates of return, at-
tracted substantial private investments because of the underwriting
restrictions on government-sponsored secondary market entities.16 The
12. See Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the
Duty to Decide, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1514–16 (2008).
13. Subprime mortgages, available to buyers with less than perfect credit, were not
new products, but were niche products usually offered to upscale borrowers with par-
ticular cash flow needs or to borrowers who were expecting to remain in their homes
for a short time. Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products:
Hearing on the Issues Surrounding Non-Traditional Mortgages and their Possible
Implications for Consumers, Financial Institutions, and the Economy Before the Sub-
comm. on Hous. & Transport. and the Subcom. on Econ. Pol’y of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 7–9, (2006) (statement of Allen J.
Fishbein, Director of Housing Policy, Consumer Federation of America) (showing an
increase in the origination of riskier loans from 2002 to 2006); CHRISTOPHER L.
FOOTE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., WHY DID SO MANY PEOPLE MAKE SO
MANY EX POST BAD DECISIONS? THE CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS. 49–50
(2012) (discussing flaws in twelve myths about the foreclosure crisis).
14. Subprime borrowers pay higher interest rates on their mortgages due to the in-
creased risk of default making these loans particularly attractive to investors. The
Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, in NEVA GOODWIN ET AL.,
MACROECONOMICS IN CONTEXT 343 (2d ed. 2014).
15. See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 3 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. & Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=12
55362 (discussing the varying investment risk in subprime lending).
16. Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both government-sponsored entities,
originally had conforming limits set by Congress that affected their ability to make
certain loans, some of these restrictions were lifted and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
purchased subprime loans. See Kimberly Amadeo, Did Fannie and Freddie Cause the
Mortgage Crisis?, THE BALANCE (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/did-
fannie-and-freddie-cause-the-mortgage-crisis-3305659.
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securities, partitioned into tranches according to risk, allowed inves-
tors to make purchases according to their speculation tolerance. How-
ever, partitioned securitization created some securities that were
riskier than the original mortgages and made it more difficult to estab-
lish the values of various tranches.17
Credit rating agencies, and arguably regulators and investors, un-
derstood how extensive the structural failure that resulted in the sub-
prime crisis could be. Investors, who are expected to conduct their
own assessments, rely on investment grade labeling when they make
purchases.18 Credit rating agencies intended to fill in informational
gaps created by securitization by rating the underlying assets accord-
ing to its risks.19 However, the financial crisis exposed intrinsic struc-
tural flaws in the credit ratings used in the mortgage securitization
process.20 One such flaw was that credit rating agencies failed to con-
17. Subprime loans were securitized into mortgage-backed securities and collateral-
ized debt obligations (CDOs). Many of these were adjustable-rate mortgages, requir-
ing borrowers to re-finance within a specified time, on the assumption was that real
estate values would continue to appreciate, making the loan more affordable. Donald
MacKenzie, The Credit Crisis as a Problem in The Sociology of Knowledge, 116 AM.
J. OF SOC. 1778, 1779 (2011).
18. Numerous scholars argue that investor over-reliance on credit ratings was one
of the causes of the financial crisis. See TECH. COMM. INT’L ORG. SECS. COMM’NS,
THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS (2008)
[hereinafter IOSCO CRA REPORT], http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS-
COPD270.pdf (updating the Code after the 2008 financial crisis to cover the rating of
structured finance products and related transactions); Jan De Bruyne, How the Threat
of Holding Credit Rating Agencies Liable Might Increase the Accuracy of Their Rat-
ings, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 173, 208 (2015) (discussing negligence claims against
CRAs); Allana M. Grinshteyn, Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: The Dodd-Frank
Act’s (Almost) Attack on Credit Rating Agencies, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 957
(2011) (discussing Dodd-Frank’s new cause of action for credit rating agency
liability).
19. Credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, provide
ratings based on their assessments of whether the issuer will pay the promised interest
or principal payments. See generally GARY SHORTER & MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40613, CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND THEIR REGULATION
(2009).
20. “This crisis could not have happened without the rating agencies.” FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES xxv (2011), http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/
GPO-FCIC.pdf; see also The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Fi-
nance Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Spon-
sored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 47 (2007) [hereinafter Role
of Credit Rating Agency Hearings] (statement of H. Sean Mathis) (investigating the
role of credit rating agencies in engineering and grading structured finance products).
Congress enacted The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
12 U.S.C. § 5301, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-
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duct their own due diligence on the quality of the securities.21 The
crisis brought into clearer focus the dual purpose of credit ratings—to
serve as a check on the originators’ securitization policies and prac-
tices as well as to predict whether the securities would yield the ex-
pected returns. This duality led to the result that borrowers who want
to purchase affordable loans with fair terms indirectly rely on credit
ratings to the same extent as investors do.
The conflict of interest presented by the issuer-pays credit rating
model requires an analysis of its effects from the perspective of bor-
rowers and investors who have a vested interest in credit ratings.22
Multiple stages in the securitization process create the problem of in-
formation asymmetry, meaning one party in the transaction has supe-
rior knowledge compared to the other.23 A purportedly objective,
neutral credit rating would eliminate the loan originators’ informa-
tional advantage over investors and borrowers. However, the struc-
tural flaw in the issuer-pays model prevented credit rating agencies
from achieving such a goal.
Designed to protect borrowers and investors, the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
made significant changes to the financial services industry.24 Although
Dodd-Frank required the SEC to assume more authority over credit
Frank], in response to the global financial crisis. Dodd-Frank was the most significant
reform of the financial industry since the Great Depression.
21. Professor Steven Schwarcz identifies three causes of the subprime crisis: con-
flicts, complacency, and complexity. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Mar-
kets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 404
(2008) (positing that the securities issued were so complex that the disclosures issued
by the credit rating agencies were insufficient for investors to assess risk); see also
Miguel Segoviano et al., Securitization: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead, 14
(Int’l Monetary Fund, WP/13/255, 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2013/wp13255.pdf (discussing the significant negative impact that the misaligned in-
centives had on the borrower and the investor).
22. See Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-Frank Act
End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 1, 37–52 (2012).
23. Eight different parties participate in a mortgage-backed security transaction: the
loan originator, the securitizer, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), underwriters, rating
agencies, trustees, servicers, and ultimately investors. See Yuliya Guseva, Evolution-
ary Developments in Mortgage Securitization: Financial Law Reforms, Putative Ben-
eficiaries, and Archetypal Economic Risks, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
395, 406–16 (2012); cf. FOOTE ET AL., supra note 13, at 35–38 (arguing that the
changed regulations are insufficient to address the underlying causes of the crisis be-
cause the housing bubble was sustained by the mistaken belief of borrowers and in-
vestors that housing prices would rise rapidly and could never fall).
24. Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in response to the global financial crisis. Dodd-
Frank resulted in the most significant reform of the financial industry since the Great
Depression. See supra note 20.
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rating agencies, the SEC did not abandon the issuer-pays model of
credit ratings.25
This Article proposes to address this structural flaw by requiring
credit rating agencies to conduct due diligence by independently veri-
fying and substantiating information provided by issuers. Due dili-
gence incorporates quality standards into the rating process and deters
issuers’ abuse of information, which in turn ensures the accuracy of
information going into the business models that produce credit ratings.
Part I discusses the credit rating process and the role that credit
rating agencies play in risk assessments of structured finance products,
and argues that these private companies perform a regulatory function
for the public benefit. Part II examines the failed economic and legal
principles underlying securitization and the regulatory structure that
facilitated it. Part II also argues that the combination of deregulation,
vertical integration of banking companies, and opportunistic securi-
tization harms borrowers and investors alike. Part III contends that due
diligence from credit rating agencies is needed to restore investor con-
fidence in the private-label mortgage securitization market. It posits
that Dodd-Frank’s reforms on loan origination, borrower creditworthi-
ness, and credit rating disclosures do not adequately protect the inter-
ests of borrowers and investors, given the conflict of interest inherent
in the issuer-pays structure. These changes will meaningfully address
the conflict of interest and the information asymmetry in the mortgage
securitization process, ensure that mortgage-backed securities are sus-
tainable and profit-maximizing, and enhance the transparency of credit
ratings to better protect both borrowers and investors.
I.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
Securitization, at its best, relies on market discipline and accurate
information to prevail.26 Credit rating agencies play an important role
in the system by serving as informational intermediaries between bor-
25. The SEC now requires disclosure of models and assumptions. Under section
15E(s), “Transparency of Credit Rating Methodologies and Information Reviewed,”
the ratings agencies must disclose information on the quality of data reviewed. They
must also disclose information that might affect the uncertainty of the rating, any
third-party due diligence services used, and a description of their findings or conclu-
sions. Dodd-Frank § 932(a)(8).
26. See generally Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1984); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure Sys-
tem, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 747 (1984).
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rowers and investors.27 They help to direct capital to efficient use by
assessing the accuracy of the information that borrowers provide,
weighing and pricing risks, testing the assumptions underlying issuers’
projections, and evaluating performance under stress scenarios.28
A. The Credit Rating Process
Credit rating agencies provide an assessment of the issuer’s abil-
ity to pay its financial obligation. Investors then use these credit rat-
ings to evaluate the quality of the debt and to measure the probability
of default. Internal committees at individual rating agencies determine
credit ratings by reviewing and approving the alphanumeric rating cat-
egories that are assigned to debt securities.29 These ratings are based
on a variety of quantitative and qualitative factors weighed by the
committees.30
Mortgage securitization ratings are relatively new.31 Traditional
corporate finance ratings are based on a routine financial analysis of a
firm’s financial risks based on balance sheets, liquidity, cash genera-
tion, and its credit risks based on the firm’s priority debt instruments
and the value of the firm in default.32 In contrast, structured finance
focuses on the legal and financial structure of a debt security as well
as the quality of assets on which the security is based. Ratings evalu-
ate how defaults in the underlying pool of mortgages or other assets
will affect the risk of default to each level or tranche of a security.33
27. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Regulating Informational Intermediation, 1 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 59, 68 (2012).
28. Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed
America and What Can Be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1275, 1288
(2009) (discussing SEC’s efforts to improve transparency of the credit rating process
for the benefit of investors).
29. SEC OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, INVESTOR BULLETIN: THE ABCS OF
CREDIT RATINGS 3, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_creditratings.pdf.
30. See, e.g., MOODY’S INV’RS SERV., RATINGS SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 32
(2013), https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
79004.
31. Because it involved “highly complex structured products,” mortgage securitiza-
tion ratings were unlike the corporate ratings that the rating agencies traditionally
performed. See Segoviano et al., supra note 21, at 20.
32. In general, the qualitative factors evaluate the market potential of the customers
and management controls and the quantitative factors evaluate the balance sheet and
external ratings. See, e.g., HERWIG M. LANGOHR & PATRICIA LANGOHR, THE RATING
AGENCIES AND THEIR CREDIT RATINGS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW THEY WORK, AND
WHY THEY ARE RELEVANT 257–63 (2008).
33. Prior to the financial crisis, structured finance debt ratings primarily used math-
ematical models. The historical rates of default and losses were based on mortgages
made between 1994–2000. Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency
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B. Credit Ratings as Public Information
Credit ratings, when accurate, shift transaction costs from origi-
nators to issuers.34 However, credit rating agencies perform optimally
only if they have adequate information from issuers. By transforming
raw data into useful information, the agencies provide market partici-
pants with information that they often would not be able to amass on
their own.35 Issuers, in turn, shift transaction costs to investors. Inves-
tors rely on ratings analysis to understand the offerings’ market and
economic circumstances, and to determine whether issuers will meet
their financial and contractual obligations. As a part of the SEC dis-
closure process, ratings that are accurate indicators of market risk can
make markets more transparent.36 Investors can then expect that the
germane characteristics about securities are fully and fairly revealed,
and thus they have a sufficient opportunity to independently assess the
value of the offering.37
Because ratings are required in the securities market, credit rating
agencies indirectly facilitate market development.38 Although credit
ratings do not assess market liquidity or volatility, they embody accu-
mulated knowledge about past and present market performance, effi-
cacy of financial innovations, and market trends.39 Projecting the
performance of a new security in essence provides an assessment of
Failures in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111,
1124–1126 (2009).
34. Disclosure rules exist to provide investors with the critical information needed
to assess profitability and performance. A popular phrase in this context is “sunlight is
the best disinfectant.” THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 1.2[3] (7th ed. 2017).
35. See Dombalagian, supra note 27, at 63 (analyzing alternative regulatory re-
gimes for credit rating agencies).
36. While credit rating agencies are not auditors, there are serious questions about
whether those agencies should have reassessed the quality of their methodologies and
underlying assumptions when rating subprime structured finance instruments in light
of credible information regarding housing market bubbles in the United States, the
lack of incentives for mortgage lenders to conduct proper due diligence, and a possi-
ble increase in mortgage fraud, among other things. Floyd Norris, Regulators Struggle
with Conflicts in Credit Ratings and Audits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2014, at B1.
37. But see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43,
65 n.110 (2004) (noting that the most sophisticated investors arguably do not rely on
credit rating agencies given their consistently poor performance).
38. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Finan-
cial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 36 (2009).
39. Brown, supra note 22, at 50 (“[T]he credit rating agencies were tasked with
rating new financial innovations for which there was no historical track record.”);
Peter H. Hamner, The Credit Crisis and Subprime Litigation: How Fraud Without
Motive “Makes Little Economic Sense,” 1 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 103, 110–11 (2010)
(discussing the primary financial and economic reasons for securitization).
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market demand for that security. Credit rating agencies’ role in facili-
tating market development is even more critical in new and evolving
markets because projections of these markets require nuance and pre-
cision.40 Therefore, the objectivity of the ratings process should serve
as a foil to financial innovation and engineering, which is neither safe
nor sound, and neutral credit rating procedures should identify flaws
in the design of financial instruments.
Innovative financial engineering created products that completely
changed the mortgage securitization market.41 The uniqueness of the
products required some form of credibility to substantiate them as via-
ble investment vehicles. Credit ratings—supposedly neutral, objective
evaluations—served that function. Investors presumed that the infor-
mation embedded in the ratings was a reliable indicator of
creditworthiness. Credit rating agencies were instrumental in develop-
ing the subprime market and attracting investors to it because they
provided integral information for would-be investors.
In addition to investors, issuers also relied on the ratings. The
growth and competitiveness of the subprime securitization market de-
pended on access to information embedded in the ratings. But issuers
were also faced with the dominance and fundamental nature of the
oligarchical credit ratings industry. The supremacy of the largest rat-
ings agencies’ abilities to control the manner and mode of the ratings
process subjected issuers to adhere to the credit rating agencies’ estab-
lished standards. The credit ratings structure is so unique and complex
that it cannot be feasibly replicated from an outside source without
complete knowledge about the methodologies and assumptions.42 In
40. One of the significant errors credit rating agencies made in subprime mortgage
securitization assessments was evaluating them in the same way as prime conforming
mortgages, which are less complex. As one witness in a Congressional hearing
explained:
The NRSROs, however, overlooked the crucial and well-known charac-
teristics of collateral risk and heterogeneity and supported the rapidly
growing sector by rating complex and lucrative security structures for
subprime mortgages as if the collateral were typical prime conforming
mortgages.
Role of Credit Rating Agencies Hearings, supra note 20, at 2 (statement of Dr. Joseph R
R. Mason, Lebow College of Business, Drexel University).
41. Often issuers told originators what products they wanted developed and the rat-
ing company complied. Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand A
(Much Larger) Lemons Premium?, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 55 (2011) (“Rat-
ing agencies worked with the issuers and their lawyers to craft instruments the agen-
cies could rate highly.”).
42. See Guseva, supra note 23, at 401 (arguing that structural securitization in-
creases costs and risks because of its complexity); Bianca Mostacatto, Eliminating
Regulatory Reliance on Credit Ratings: Restoring the Strength of Reputational Con-
cerns, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 138–140 (2013) (positing that replacing ratings-
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this way, the credit rating agencies created both an information market
that issuers were bound to participate in and a market that could not
operate without the expected and required ratings.
The financial information that credit ratings provide serves a reg-
ulatory function, which is for the public good.43 Charged with regulat-
ing capital markets, the SEC uses credit ratings to safeguard the
adequacy of financial institutions’ capital.44 The credit rating of a se-
curities offering is a proxy for government approval and signals that
the offering meets basic valuations and risk requirements, ensuring its
capital adequacy.45 Credit rating agencies distinguish investment
grade securities from those that are less liquid and more volatile,46 and
allow investors to further evaluate the data and make informed
choices. Investors’ evaluation of financial instruments is presumed to
simply supplement the SEC’s merit review of securities offerings.47
Investors, who wanted to participate in the subprime securities
market, needed access to the aggregated data provided exclusively by
the oligarchical ratings information market.48 Given the complexity of
subprime mortgage-backed securities, whether investors could accu-
based regulation with reputation mechanism produces ratings that are more accurate
and beneficial to the capital markets).
43. See Panayotis Gavras, Ratings Game, 49 FIN. & DEV. 34, 36 (2012) (arguing
that there is an over-reliance on private credit rating agencies to assess risk).
44. See Brown, supra note 22, at 49 (discussing the “countercyclical” capital re-
quirements of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule).
45. See Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards: A Revised Framework, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 23
(Nov. 2005) [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE] http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf.
46. As one industry executive explained, “[w]hile the SEC clearly equated the term
‘investment-grade’ with liquidity, that fact was never memorialized in legislation, pro-
cess, or definition.” Role of Credit Rating Agencies Hearings, supra note 20, at 2 R
(statement of H. Sean Mathis, Miller Mathis & Co., LLC).
47. The present model assumes that the credit rating agencies are “gatekeepers of
risk.” This assumption is criticized because the rating agencies are not accountable
and do not seem to have an incentive to perform well. See generally Rachel Jones,
The Need for A Negligence Standard of Care for Credit Rating Agencies, 1 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 201, 231 (2010) (arguing that it is inappropriate to apply First
Amendment protections to financial information because credit rating agencies, unlike
journalists, are not independent); Jefferey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1011, 1059–65 (2009) (advocating that creditors should finance the ratings
through an SEC-administered user fee system).
48. For example, from 2000–2007, Moody’s rated 42,625 residential mortgages
“AAA.” In 2006, $869 billion worth of mortgage securities were AAA-rated by
Moody’s, eighty-three percent of which were later downgraded. See Credibility of
Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Fi-
nancial Crisis: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong.
10 (2010) [hereinafter CRA June 2010 Hearing] (statement of Phil Angelides,
Chairman).
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rately assess risks in these securities is open for debate.49 Investors
also rely on credit ratings because of the difficulty of assessing infor-
mation and the distance between investors and borrowers.50 The vari-
ance in mortgage terms and obligations makes this particular sector
too heavily reliant on credit ratings to attract investors without credit
ratings.
Investors face significant barriers in evaluating mortgage securi-
ties. Insufficient information in the market about exotic mortgage se-
curities, such as credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs)51, and the opacity of these instruments made it
difficult to gauge and price risks.52 In addition, the complexity of of-
ferings made investors more dependent on the credit ratings. Ratings
provided a basis for investors to conclude that novel financial products
were standard and safe, even though these products’ structures were
actually very new and complex, and the underlying assets were too
volatile to be modeled properly.53 Thus, investors’ duty to indepen-
dently review the risks of mortgage securities was effectively
abrogated.54
49. In particular, there are serious questions about whether institutional investors,
either through ignorance or lax internal governance and risk management, relied ex-
cessively on credit ratings, with little regard for the underlying risks of the financial
instruments they bought. Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 381; see generally Brent J.
Horton, Toward A More Perfect Substitute: How Pressure on the Issuers of Private-
Label Mortgage-Backed Securities Can Improve the Accuracy of Ratings, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1905 (2013) (proposing that the SEC require rating agencies to have an ongoing
monitoring duty that includes verifying loan-level data and regularly updating
macroeconomic trend data).
50. Credit rating agency reforms under Dodd-Frank are designed to lessen the de-
pendence of investors on agency ratings. See discussion infra Part III.
51. The CDO is a “bond that is backed by the cash flows on underlying pools of
debt or debt-like instruments, such as corporate loans, other asset-backed securities,
or credit default swap (CDS) contracts.” Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation
Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 66 (2011).
52. Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1113–14 (explaining that the cost-benefit of independent
assessments in complex transactions might yield false results because there are tangi-
ble costs but intangible benefits).
53. The standard practice at the time was to use “methodologies [that are] rigorous
[and] systematic . . . subject to some form of validation based on historical experi-
ence.” IOSCO CRA REPORT, supra note 18, at 2. The faulty assumption was that the
newly engineered financial products comprised of subprime mortgages had a low
credit risk. The rating agencies were virtual prerequisites for most debt issuances, and
yet had no accountability or incentive to provide accurate information and mitigate
risk. Id.
54. Subprime mortgages were compartmentalized into tranches, according to risk.
Investors in the highest tranches were the most protected from loss and effectively
were “free riders” who had less incentive to conduct due diligence. John Kiff & Paul
Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S. Sub-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-2\NYL203.txt unknown Seq: 14  7-SEP-17 14:55
464 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:451
As discussed below, the securitization of subprime mortgages
turned predatory and failed to satisfy economic and legal principles.
These failures in fact underscore the opaqueness of the information
and support the proposals set forth in Part III to modify the intermedi-
ation functions of mortgage securitization.
II.
THE ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY COMPLICATIONS OF
SECURITIZATION
A. The Economic Principles of Securitization
Financial innovation presents unique opportunities for capital de-
velopment. With adverse incentives and an inadequate regulatory
framework, financial innovation can result in systemic risks. This Part
first introduces the benefits and complications of securitization and
then discusses the role of capital requirements in mitigating moral
hazard and regulatory arbitrage. This Part concludes with a discussion
of the risk retention provision in Dodd-Frank and why it is ineffectual
in addressing moral hazard.
1. The Value of Mortgage Securitization
Securitization is attractive because it achieves economic effi-
ciency through diversification and liquidity, transfers risks to reduce
the costs of capital, and makes credit more freely available. Investor
partition in the market reduces the costs of capital, keeps regulatory
capital low, and also increases the availability of credit. Subprime
securitization, which flourished in an era of deregulation, juxtaposed
efficiency against profit maximization, affordable financing against
poor-quality lending, and credit availability against loan volume.55
The complexity of subprime securitization, operating in an unregu-
lated market, undermined securitization’s underlying economic and le-
gal principles.
Securitization is an alternative funding mechanism that allows
lenders to raise cash by converting long-term obligations on balance
prime Mortgage Markets, 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, WP/07/188, 2007), https://
www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/
_wp07188.ashx.
55. Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law:
From Market Fundamentalism to A New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 369, 377–380 (2009) (discussing the confluence of deregulation of depos-
itory interest rates and the Federal Reserve’s credit controls incentivizing securitiza-
tion of subprime loans).
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sheets into securities.56 Mortgage securitization is the process of dis-
aggregating a borrower from the mortgage loan. It involves bundling
mortgages into pools, separating securities into risk tranches, rating
future credit performance of the securities, and selling securities to
investors.57
The mortgage securitization process involves several stages. The
originator, who made the initial loans to borrowers, selects a group of
assets to sell to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a stand-alone bank-
rupt-remote entity, which becomes the securities issuer.58 The issuer,
who may or may not be the originator, hires a credit rating agency to
assess the creditworthiness of the securities.59 After receiving a
favorable rating, the SPV issues interest-bearing securities. Investors
then purchase the securities and are paid cash flows generated by the
asset pool over the life of the loan. Cash generated from these
purchases of securities goes back to the originator.60
a. Diversification and Liquidity
Securitization diversifies risks: a lender can choose to share risks
by moving loans off of its balance sheet.61 This mixture of on- and
off-balance sheet lending reduces the lender’s exposure to loans de-
faults. By spreading the risks, securitization mitigates the impacts of
bank funding shocks on the availability of residential mortgages.62
Securitization also enables lenders to hold fewer liquid assets and
expand lending capacity; expanded lending capacity leads to increased
profitability.63 Lenders convert a present right to future payments into
56. See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2004).
57. Donald J. Kochan, Certainty of Title: Perspectives After the Mortgage Foreclo-
sure Crisis on the Essential Role of Effective Recording Systems, 66 ARK. L. REV. 267
(2013).
58. Ryan E. Scharar, The Limits of Securitization: Why Bankruptcy Courts Should
Substantively Consolidate Predatory Sub-Prime Mortgage Originators and Their Spe-
cial Purpose Entities, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 913, 913 n.7 (2008).
59. F. Phillip Hosp, Problems and Reforms in Mortgage-Backed Securities: Handi-
capping the Credit Rating Agencies, 79 MISS. L.J. 531, 548 (2010).
60. Special investment vehicles were advantageous for banks to use because they
allowed an off-balance sheet transaction for low-quality loans, allowing banks to
avoid capital and leverage requirements. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller,
Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic
Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 171 (2011).
61. See Brown, supra note 22, at 79.
62. Elena Loutskina & Philip E. Strahan, Securitization and the Declining Impact of
Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations, 64 J. FIN. 861
(2009).
63. Elena Loutskina, The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding
Management, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 663, 663–83 (2011).
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lump sum cash payments, which, in turn, are used to fund current
projects. Along with increased cash flow, lenders reduce their debts
without negatively impacting their financial status.64 After selling the
loans onto the secondary market, lenders re-cycle the cash to make
new loans.
Allowing asset classification by level of risk also increases the
value of the securitized assets on the lender’s balance sheet. The issuer
or securitizer classifies assets according to the level of risk and sells
them in “tranches” to investors, according to value, costs, rights, and
privileges.65 Securitizing assets presents a significant advantage when
the originator has an unfavorable credit rating. The securitized assets
pool, as well as the tranches within the pool, receive a credit rating
separate from the originator. As a result, financing rates correlate to
the quality of the underlying assets, rather than the institution’s
creditworthiness.66 Thus, the originator is able to borrow funds more
cheaply.67
b. Reduction of Regulatory Capital
Prior to the financial crisis, favorable regulatory capital rules en-
couraged securitization. As heavily-regulated financial institutions,
banks must maintain a certain minimum regulatory capital ratio; in
other words, banks must hold onto a certain amount of solvent assets.
Securitization of assets moves debts off-balance sheet and improves
the bank’s regulatory capital.68
The regulatory capital ratio measures risk. It is a ratio of a finan-
cial institution’s capital to the risk sensitivity of its assets. On- and off-
balance sheet assets are measured against the institution’s equity to
determine the financial institution’s capital adequacy.69 An inadequate
64. Securitization allows banks to sell off risks while simultaneously generating a
profit. See, e.g., Michel G. Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of 2007, 16.1 J.
DERIVATIVES 81, 103 (2008).
65. Issuers of the structured product often decide beforehand what rating each
tranche will have and then assign mortgages and then structure the tranches accord-
ingly. See Lisbeth Freeman, Who’s Guarding the Gate? Credit-Rating Agency Liabil-
ity as “Control Person” in the Subprime Credit Crisis, 33 VT. L. REV. 585, 602
(2009).
66. Harald Hau, Sam Langfield, & David Marques-Ibanez, Bank Ratings What De-
termines Their Quality? 11–12 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No.
1484, 2012).
67. Andreas Jobst, Back to Basics: What is Securitization, 45 FIN. & DEV. 48
(2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/pdf/fd0908.pdf.
68. See BASEL COMMITTEE, supra note 45.
69. 12 C.F.R. § 522.1 (2014).
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capital status subjects a financial institution to regulatory restrictions
and sanctions.70
The burden of meeting regulatory capital guidelines is eased
when banks securitize assets. To the extent that a revenue-generating
asset can be securitized, it reduces the amount of regulatory capital a
financial institution must maintain.71 Off-balance sheet assets receive
reduced regulatory capital as compared to on-balance sheet holdings.72
Arguably, banks securitizing assets sought both efficiency in mortgage
financing and a reduction in capital requirements. Given the market
perceptions of mortgage risks, bankers generally viewed securitized
subprime mortgages as safe.73
In general, regulatory costs in the form of capital requirements
created an incentive for banks to shrink their balance sheets by securi-
tizing loans. The industry consensus has consistently held that regula-
tory capital requirements for the traditionally stable mortgage loan
category were too high. Lenders considered mortgage loans to be
“good assets” because the bank’s risk level remained the same.74 The
regulatory costs provided a disincentive for banks to hold these loans
on their balance sheets. Instead, it was more profitable for banks to
securitize any stable assets and to produce revenues from origination
and other services.75
Finally, bank managers followed accounting conventions to con-
trol regulatory capital requirements.76 Favorable accounting rules re-
70. Id. § 522.3 (2014).
71. See discussion of regulatory arbitrage infra note 115 and accompanying text.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 522.2 (2014).
73. See BASEL COMMITTEE, supra note 45.
74. Private investors usually fund subprime mortgages, which provides more flexi-
bility in interest rates and underwriting for borrowers. Philip Ashton, An Appetite for
Yield: The Anatomy of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 41 ENV’T & PLANNING 1420,
1428 (2009).
75. The total amount of subprime originations increased from $34 billion in 1994 to
$213 billion in 2002. U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Economic Issues in Predatory
Lending 5 (Adm’r of Nat’l Banks Working Paper 2003). Lenders took advantage of
the capital and accounting rules to increase short term liquidity, using the cash they
generated to make loans. The fees and profits that they accrued on the front-end of the
transaction were used up quickly when they made more loans, requiring them to keep
repeating the cycle. With the fast rate of sales, lenders focused more on the quantity of
the loans, rather than their quality. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
76. This is an especially common tactic when a bank’s assets have become im-
paired. Securitizing banks exercised discretion in choosing which assets to move off
balance sheets and which to retain. In addition, if the transactions did not receive off-
balance sheet treatment, the benefit to financial institutions was reduced. See gener-
ally Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for
“Dirty Pooling” and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L.
141, 167 (1997).
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garding securitized assets created more balance sheet flexibility.77
Under those rules, gains on securitization sales were recognized on the
front-end of a transaction;78 de-recognition of assets and a sale of
securitized assets generated profits and artificially improved capital
adequacy, while securitizing or selling off assets removed assets from
the financial institution’s balance sheet.79 This created cash on the in-
stitutions’ balance sheets that could be recorded at the present value of
the expected cash flow reduced by the net assets—an accounting con-
vention which allowed liabilities to remain unchanged.80
Although banks retained some subprime mortgages on balance
assets, the banks’ dual function of originating and managing securities
was very beneficial.81 Banks made more credit available by managing
balance sheets in a way that optimized product risk and return. Align-
77. The accounting rules gave sales treatment to securitized assets, which en-
couraged the originators to distribute loans for securitization. Accounting rules al-
lowed the recognition of gains on sales at the front-end of securitization. Financial
institutions reported the cash from sales as profits, although it was difficult to calcu-
late the exact amount of the gains. Sale of the assets could be timed to achieve the
most profitable gains, which also inflated balance sheets. See generally S.P. Kothari
& Rebecca Lester, The Role of Accounting in the Financial Crisis: Lessons for the
Future, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 335, 351 (2012).
78. See Robert F. Hugi et al., U.S. Adoption of Basel II and the Basel II Securitiza-
tion Framework, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 45, 76 (2008) (explaining securitization ex-
posure on interest-only subordinated strips).
79. The originator does not have to wait to receive payment of the receivables (or,
in a “future flow” securitization, until it even generates them) to obtain funds to
continue its business and generate new receivables. In many cases this is essential and
a role otherwise filled by more traditional methods of financing, including factoring.
This is more significant when the receivables are relatively long-term, such as with
real property mortgages, auto loans, or student loans, and not as significant with short-
term receivables, such as trade and credit card receivables. See FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140: AC-
COUNTING TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS
OF LIABILITIES, 10( C) 140-12, (2000), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/
DocumentPage?cid=1218220124871&acceptedDisclaimer=true.
80. Thus, companies received the benefit of selling off their “event risks” and si-
multaneously generating capital without negatively impacting their financial state-
ments. See Peter J. Lahny IV, Asset Securitization: A Discussion of the Traditional
Bankruptcy Attacks and an Analysis of the Next Potential Attack, Substantive Consoli-
dation, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 815, 827–28 (2001).
81. Retained on-balance sheet assets required equity capital, which is determined
based on the riskiness of the assets. Banks had the discretion to determine how to
meet those requirements. Senior tranches require less capital and can be mixed with
junior tranches that require more capital lowering the amount of capital that must be
held for all of the securities. In the industry, the lowest tranches were referred to as
“toxic waste,” indicating the significant portability that those security holders would
not receive a return. See Gu¨nter Franke & Jan P. Krahnen, The Future of Securitiza-
tion (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 2008/31, 2008); Olaf Clemens, Ac-
counting Discretion, Securitization, and the Subprime Crisis: An Accounting-based
Analysis of the Subprime Market 33 (Jan. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
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ing risks in this way is arguably an efficient use of regulatory capital.
However, the manipulation of regulatory capital exposes the FDIC to
insolvency.82
c. Affordable Financing
Securitization allows lenders to reduce costs of lending. As the
mortgage markets become more liquid, more affordable financing is
available to borrowers. Spreading the risks of borrowing eventually
leads to lower interest rates on home mortgages.83 Through the pro-
cess of securitization, the risk of default is transferred from a single
lender to investors. Mortgage securities are then priced based on the
potential of loss, allowing investors to select a preferred risk toler-
ance.84 Investors choose between safer securities, which pay lower in-
terest rates, and riskier securities, which generate higher interest rates.
By differentiating the securities’ risks, the market becomes attractive
to a wider group of investors and thus becomes more liquid. As more
investors participate in the market, more loan funds become available
and interest rates decline.85
2. The Disadvantages of Subprime Securitization
Impaired subprime securitization created substantial risks in the
financial system. The vulnerabilities included excessive credit growth,
asset price bubbles, looser lending standards, the emergence of finan-
with author) (discussing the controversies surrounding fair value accounting in the
subprime crisis).
82. See Clemens, supra note 80, at 37–38 (describing the off-balance sheet vehicles
used in the subprime crisis as “inglorious”).
83. Manuel B. Aalbers, The Financialization of Home and The Mortgage Market
Crisis, 12 COMPETITION & CHANGE 148, 150–53 (2008).
84. The securities issued in the securitization are more highly rated by participating
rating agencies (because of the isolation of the receivables in a “bankruptcy-remote”
entity), thus reducing the cost of funds to the originator when compared to traditional
forms of financing. In instances when the receivables earn interest, there is usually a
significant spread between the interest paid on the securities and the interest earned on
the receivables. Ultimately, the originator receives the benefit of the spread. In addi-
tion, the originator usually acts as servicer and receives a fee for its services. See
Lahny IV, supra note 79, at 827–28.
85. Santiago Carbo´ Valverde et al., Securitization, Bank Lending, and Credit Qual-
ity: The Case of Spain 1329 (European Cent. Bank., Working Paper Series No. 8,
2011) (finding a positive correlation between securitization and lower rates of interest
for home loans, suggesting that the savings enjoyed by lenders are passed on to
borrowers).
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cial engineering, and perverse investment incentives, resulting in a
general decline in collateral standards and lending.86
a. Excessive Increases in Credit Growth and Asset Prices
The flow of credit in the regulated banking and shadow bank-
ing87 sectors increased with increased securitization. Bank portfolios
very quickly expanded with poorer quality loans. Along with the
credit expansion, asset prices persistently increased, but were followed
by rapid reversals.88 With no limits on asset concentration or credit
growth, the market grew to accompany the demand, resulting in sys-
temic risks and financial instability.89
b. Asymmetric Information
The participation of credit rating agencies in the securitization
process also caused agency problems. The combined effects of infor-
mation asymmetry and agency problems existed in various stages.90
When the monitoring system is improper, one party acts in its own
interests and ignores the interests of others.91 Each party in the securi-
tization chain forewent the duty to adequately monitor the preceding
party’s transaction. Originators acted as agents for issuers by control-
ling the quality of borrowers, issuers acted as agents for warehouse
lenders and investors by controlling the quality of loans in the securi-
ties pool, and credit rating agencies acted as agents for issuers by con-
trolling the assessments of the loan pool. However, many investors
86. Andrea Heuson et al., Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Implica-
tions for Mortgage Rates and Credit Availability, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 337
(2001).
87. Shadow banks, which rely on short-term debt, do not accept deposits like a
depository bank and therefore are not subject to the same regulations. See Kathryn
Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 420 (2017)
(“The shadow banking system is an intermediation regime that resides in the capital
markets while serving many of the economic functions traditionally fulfilled by
banks.”).
88. See generally Miroslav Misina & Greg Tkacz, Credit, Asset Prices, and Finan-
cial Stress, 5 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 95 (2009) (concluding that domestic credit
growth is the best predictor of a financial crisis in developed countries).
89. GIOVANNI DELL’ARICCIA ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, POLICIES FOR
MACROFINANCIAL STABILITY: DEALING WITH CREDIT BOOMS AND BUSTS 2 (2012),
http://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/sdn
/2012/_sdn1206.ashx (critiquing the appropriate policy response to credit booms).
90. When It Goes Wrong . . ., ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.economist.
com/node/9830765; see also Clemens, supra note 80 (discussing the inherent weak-
nesses in the accounting standards and the subprime crisis).
91. Gubler, supra note 51, at 60 (discussing the failure of credit rating agencies to
detect the informational asymmetries in financial innovation products).
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incorrectly assumed that credit rating agencies acted on behalf of
investors.
Even though originators were most knowledgeable of the trust-
worthiness of borrowers, the asymmetric information theory of loan
origination presupposes that originators lack the incentive to properly
screen out risky loans.92 Consequently, moral hazard and adverse se-
lection resulted in excessive borrowing and lending.93 At least two
aspects of securitized mortgage transactions allowed originators to
gain an efficiency advantage: First, securitization lowered the costs of
funds and thus made it profitable for an originator to sell all of the
securitized loans. Second, originators were aware that issuers did not
independently verify borrowers’ creditworthiness. Originators could
generate an essentially infinite amount of low-quality loans without
closely screening borrowers, and passed the effects of the laxity onto
the next party.94
Borrowers with relatively bad credit transfer their credit risk to
other parties in the securitization chain, including warehouse lenders,
investors, and credit rating agencies. Warehouse lenders hold the loans
making up the mortgage pool until securitization deals are completed.
Their informational disadvantage could result in an over-valuation of
the mortgages held as collateral. Requiring issuers to increase the col-
lateral on the loans that they held mitigated this problem.95 Due dili-
gence imposed a duty on issuers to look at both preceding and
subsequent parties in the securitization chain. Specifically, issuers
were required to investigate their purchases from originators in order
to protect investors.96 Theoretically, issuers could have screened the
92. Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mort-
gage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe-From Themselves, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1591–92 (2015) (discussing the potential losses originators
could suffer under risk retention procedures).
93. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Credit Crisis: Conjectures
About Causes and Remedies, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 606, 608 (2009) (discussing how
short-term debt exposure exacerbated the liquidity of banks).
94. Moral hazard occurs when risky behavior is protected. For example, although
originators made no evaluation of borrowers’ ability to repay, they had no responsibil-
ity for the delinquent loans. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L. REV. 209, 215 (2008) (describing how infor-
mation asymmetry contributes to moral hazard).
95. Cassandra Jones Havard, Post-Racial Lending?, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
176, 207 (2014) (suggesting reforms to lessen information asymmetries in warehouse
lending).
96. There were financial institutions which originated and issued their own securi-
ties, as well as investment banks that purchased mortgages from originators and is-
sued their own securities. See Kathleen C. Engel & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick,
Complexity, Complicity, and Liability Up the Securitization Food Chain: Investor and
Arranger Exposure to Consumer Claims, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 346, 349–353 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-2\NYL203.txt unknown Seq: 22  7-SEP-17 14:55
472 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:451
mortgages purchased from originators and rejected those of low qual-
ity. However, issuers took advantage of a classic securitization tactic:
They securitized bad loans and kept the good ones.97
Investors acted as free-riders to transfer credit risks. They chose
not to pay for their own independent assessments of the underlying
securities in an offering, as the rating process was envisioned origi-
nally.98 Instead, investors relied on expert valuations and “hidden in-
formation” embedded in credit ratings,99 and ignored the agency
issues in the issuer-pays model of credit ratings. Due to perverse in-
centives, rating agencies acted in their own best interests by providing
the inflated ratings that issuers expected. Investors failed to question
whether credit ratings accurately evaluated the quality of underlying
assets100 and were harmed by these inflated ratings.
c. Complex and Opaque Securities
Financial engineering produces synthetic and complex structured
financial products. Subprime securities, like other engineered prod-
ucts, were designed to have excessive leverage. Although subprime
securities were marketed similarly to prime mortgage-backed securi-
ties, assets underlying subprime securities could not withstand signifi-
cant adverse events because they were collateralized based on
unrealized gains in asset prices.101
97. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100
GEO. L.J. 1177, 1230 (2012) (arguing that the increased trade in subprime securities
was due to the sale of more loan pools with lemons); cf. George Akerlof, The Market
for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488,
490–92 (1970) (positing the classic example of warehouse lenders and investors as
sophisticated market participants who use contractual clauses to balance the conse-
quences of asymmetric information).
98. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
99. See EMILY MCCLINTOCK EKINS & MARK A. CALABRIA, CATO INST., REGULA-
TION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 13–14
(2012), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA704.pdf.
100. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like
Other Gatekeepers 59 (Univ. San Diego Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 07-46,
2006), http://lamfin.arizona.edu/fixi/creditmod/Portnoy.pdf (positing that, unlike other
gatekeepers, credit rating agencies are conflicted because of their relationship to
issuers).
101. Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Sub-
prime-Mortgage Financial Crisis 53–58 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective
Goods Nov. 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309442 (discussing how complexity in
financial mortgage products makes them less transparent).
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As argued above, investors were not able to adequately gauge the
risks, rights and priorities attached to securities.102 The sale of securi-
ties presumes that investors will conduct their own due diligence and
independently verify external credits.103 Given that credit rating agen-
cies incorrectly modeled subprime securitizations, investors’ over-reli-
ance on credit agency ratings exacerbated the problem.
The actual data disclosed to investors posed another impediment
to investors’ due diligence, in that the data was not comprehensive
enough for investors to make informed decisions.104 Moreover, with-
out clear explanations of the methodologies used by credit rating
agencies, only investors who were well-versed in complex securities
transactions could accurately evaluate the rating agencies’ data and
make an accurate comparison of securities.105 This resulted in most
investors’ abrogating their due diligence responsibilities.106
More importantly, the lack of transparency in the mortgage mar-
ket makes it hard for investors and financial institutions to assess their
exposure to systematic risks.107 As evidenced by the subprime crisis,
opaque subprime mortgage products caused risks that were hard to
monitor, mitigate, react to, and control.108 On one hand, the rapid
growth of the subprime mortgage market outpaced the ability of mar-
ket participants and regulators to appropriately account for such
growth.109 On the other hand, the opaqueness of financial products
made it difficult for investors to value the products, and, more impor-
tantly, made it difficult for financial institutions to assess their expo-
sure to counterparty risks. Because of the disintermediation in the
102. See supra note 51. Regulators were also not able to understand these products.
See Michel G. Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of 07, at 17 (July 9, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112467.
103. John C Hull, The Credit Crunch of 2007: What Went Wrong? Why? What
Lessons Can Be Learned? 8–12 (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www-
2.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull/downloadablepublications/CreditCrunch.pdf.
104. Id. at 11.
105. See Crouhy et al., supra note 100, at 17 (arguing that unsophisticated investors
did not have sufficient information about the quality of the underlying assets to make
an independent evaluation).
106. Investors were willing to purchase the securities regardless of their riskiness as
long as they had a AAA rating. Scharar, supra note 57, at 920–27 (discussing the
impact of predatory lending in the financial crisis).
107. Hellwig, supra note 99, at 6.
108. Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1269–70 (2009) (discussing the systemic risks of
subprime loan products).
109. Professor Aalbers argues that the rapid growth of the subprime crisis represents
the “financialization” of mortgage markets and describes it as a “highly political pro-
ject.” See Aalbers, supra note 82, at 148, 152.
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market, protection of the financial system depends on rules to limit
risk-taking.110
d. Regulatory Arbitrage
Innovations in financial products allow banks to circumvent reg-
ulatory capital and maintain or create illusory balance sheets. Securi-
tization transfers risks out of the originating bank and is an efficient
use of bank capital.111 However, the downside of securitization is that
it can avoid regulatory capital requirements and thus potentially abuse
the implicit safety net of deposit insurance.112 In this regard, regula-
tory arbitrage—or taking advantage of the regulatory loopholes—oc-
curs.113 Capital requirements, when exploited, are de-stabilizing.
Capital helps to absorb losses and serves to reinforce the bank’s sol-
vency. The possibility of default and insolvency increases when a
bank’s equity or capital declines. Banks that fall below the required
capital level shift the risk of loss to the deposit insurance funds.114
Moral hazard is identified as a cost of these innovations.115 When
another party can take some responsibility for an institution’s behav-
ior, moral hazard disincentives the institution to bear the consequences
110. Professor Schwarcz argues that systemic risk is best addressed through regula-
tion that correlates risk within the system. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97
GEO. L.J., 193, 210–234 (discussing alternative ways to regulate systemic risk in the
financial system); see also generally Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the
2007–08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009 (arguing that
opaqueness in financial products leads to systemic risk).
111. Banks finance securitization by using funds from shadow banks. Shadow banks
are non-bank institutions that are not subject to regulatory capital rules. Recently, the
Financial Stability Board drafted rules governing shadow banks. See generally Steven
L. Schwarcz, Regulatory Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 620
(2012).
112. See FSB, STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT, supra note 101, at 5. Yet regulators,
seeking to avoid abuse of the safety net through regulatory capital arbitrage, have
argued that securitization should be pure transfer of risk: Either banks should keep
their loan risks on their balance sheets (and have their minimum capital regulated
accordingly), or they should sell or securitize those assets without any hidden recourse
allowing the transfer of losses back to originating banks if securitized assets perform
badly.
113. The term regulatory arbitrage refers to financial institutions’ ability to increase
profits or reduce costs by choosing the most advantageous regulatory scheme. Frank
Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 211 (1996–97).
114. Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 429, 443 (1994).
115. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 248
(1996); see also Cassandra Jones Havard, ‘Goin’ Round in Circles’. . . and Letting the
Bad Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform
Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737, 753–56 (2008).
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of that behavior.116 One such example is regulatory arbitrage, the abil-
ity of regulated institutions to conduct activities beyond the reach of
their regulators. The regulatory landscape under which financial insti-
tutions operate—including gaps and overlap in regulations on finan-
cial transactions—allows these institutions to often circumvent the
regulations that control their actions.117 Financial markets and institu-
tions are interrelated and often perform the same functions. This func-
tion equivalence creates the risk that an institution may choose to
comply only with the regulation that is the most beneficial to it.118
The accounting treatment of asset-backed mortgages illustrates
the regulatory arbitrage in subprime mortgage securitization. Specifi-
cally, three accounting standards regarding securitizations—reporting
of immediate gains, discretion to adjust declining fair values, and slow
recognition of losses—all proved useful.119
Accounting rules permitted financial institutions, which invested
in financial instruments created based on subprime mortgages, to de-
lay recognition of likely losses. First, as explained in Part I of this
article, this accounting convention distorted measures of capital ade-
quacy. Second, the accounting rules allowed liberal reporting of the
fair values of loans within securitization pools. When the mortgage
pool included assets whose fair values were difficult to measure, origi-
nators estimated the values.120 Thus, these loans were improperly clas-
sified at a higher value at the outset.121 As borrowers began to default,
116. In the context of financial regulation, moral hazard goes hand in hand with “too
big to fail.” Financial regulation that embraces “too big to fail” is premised on the idea
that systemic failure—the failure of an institution or institutions that could bring down
the entire financial system—cannot be allowed to occur. Therefore, institutions con-
sidered “too big to fail” have little incentive to guard against risk. See Jason Rud-
derman, Eliminating Wall Street’s Safety Net: How A Systemic Risk Premium Can
Solve “Too Big to Fail”, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 39, 53 (2012).
117. See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV 277
(2011).
118. See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: AP-
PROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 34–38 (2008), http://www.
group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_StructureFinancialSupervision2008.
pdf (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of multiple versus single regulatory
authorities).
119. See Clemens, supra note 80.
120. Accounting rules required disclosure on the financial statement if using this
treatment. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS NO. 157: FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS, 157-13, ¶ 29C (2000), http://
www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=ID&blobwhere=1175823288587&blobheader
=application/pdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
121. Id. at 157–53. This standard determines fair value by classifying assets as Level
1 (assets have observable market prices), Level 2 (assets do not have observable mar-
ket prices but have inputs that are based on such prices), or Level 3 (assets do not
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the loans were re-classified; and this re-classification was inflated be-
cause the loans were not adjusted to the true declining value.122 As a
result of using the incorrect estimates, asset balances and portions of
the gain were misstated.123
This same accounting treatment may have resulted in an over-
statement on the originators’ balance sheets because liabilities were
not properly recorded. For example, some high-risk loans were securi-
tized because they had credit risk insurance.124 Representations and
warranties in the securitization contracts required repurchase under
specified conditions. Repurchases triggered losses, whose values were
estimated by management. At the time of the original transfer, a
proper accounting practice would record “repurchase obligations” as a
liability, rather than basing the value of the liability on management
estimates.125
These accounting treatments allowed management to escape the
very banking regulations meant to control their behavior.126 For exam-
ple, financial institutions allowed securitizations with implicit re-
course,127 and originating banks evaded the regulatory capital
requirements, retained risks, became insolvent, and abused the govern-
ment safety net of deposit insurance.128
B. The Regulatory Landscape of Subprime Securitization
After the collapse of the U.S. financial markets in 1929, Congress
created a fragmented regulatory framework with separate agencies fo-
cusing on separate financial activities.129 As discussed below, almost
have observable inputs; management determines valuation based on internal estimates
and models). Loans that should have been classified as Level 3 were initially classi-
fied as Level 1 or Level 2. When borrowers began to default, these loans were then re-
classified at Level 3, instead of at their true declining value. See Kothari & Lester,
supra note 76, at 348.
122. See supra note 118.
123. See Kothari & Lester, supra note 76, at 349.
124. Crouhy et al., supra note 63, at 5.
125. See Kothari & Lester, supra note 76, at 349.
126. Schwarcz, supra note 108, at 209.
127. Regulatory minimum capital requirements are designed to protect deposit insur-
ance funds. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINA-
TION POLICIES 2 (2015), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section2-
1.pdf.
128. Dodd-Frank changes accounting rules to address this problem. In 2008 and
2009, there were 25 and 140 bank failures, respectively, compared with no bank fail-
ures in 2005 and 2006, and 3 bank failures in 2007. Nickel, Looking Back at Bank
Failure Rates, FORBES: MONEY BUILDER (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/moneybuilder/2013/03/25/looking-back-at-bank-failure-rates/#6b99c2d3598b.
129. See generally Carnell Macey Miller, Dual Banking, in THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 23 (5th ed. 2013).
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three decades prior to the financial crisis, a regulatory environment
favorable to the banking and securities sectors impacted the asset-
backed securities market. Without a concomitant change to the regula-
tory structure, the mortgage crisis was inevitable.
1. SEC Regulation
In order to increase disclosure and transparency in the primary
securities market, the Securities Act of 1933 required businesses to
register the initial offer or subsequent sale of any security with the
government.130 In 1934, the Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange
Act”) established the SEC to regulate secondary stock exchanges and
enforce against fraudulent criminal acts.131 Credit ratings, prepared by
analysts based on their experiences and biases, immediately became a
part of the regulatory environment.132
Credit rating agencies sold annual bond manuals and used letter
ratings for many securities. Investment grade ratings were assigned to
railroads, utilities, industrial corporations, and governments.133 Over
time, this “subscriber pays” model was reserved for government debt
and public companies, whose financials and other information were on
the public record.134
The modern issuer-pays credit rating incentivizes low-default
originations, high-volume trading, and investor protection.135 An in-
130. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(l) (2012) (discussing civil liabilities arising in connection
with prospectuses and communications).
131. Firms are required to submit quarterly and annual reports to the SEC. Banking
Act of 1935, 12 U.S.C.A. § 228 (2012).
132. Before the 1970s, investors paid a subscription to credit rating agencies to have
access to the ratings. Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Reining in the Credit
Ratings Industry, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.labaton.com/blog/Reining-in-
the-Credit-Ratings-Industry.cfm.
133. Beginning in 1949, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) implemented a policy allowing
municipalities to pay the rating agency to conduct a rating analysis for marketing
small bond issues (if the face value was less than $1 million). In 1968, S&P began
charging for all municipal bond ratings. The issuer-pays model then spread to all asset
classes and was implemented by competing agencies. Hearing on Municipal Bond
Ratings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Progress of the Joint Econ. Comm., 90th
Cong. 193 (1968) (statement of Brenton W. Harries, Vice President, Bond and Data
Services Division, Standard & Poor’s Corp.).
134. The ratings industry has not always been an issuer-pays model. The subscriber
pays model was the accepted model until the 1970s, when subscribers demanded
“free, high quality ratings.” Joseph A. Grundfest & Evgenia Petrova, Buyer Owned
and Controlled Rating Agencies: A Summary Introduction 4 (The Rock Ctr. on Corp.
Governance, Working Paper Series No. 161, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
579/4579-10.pdf.
135. Johnathan R. Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 COR-
NELL L. REV. 592 (2013); see also Guseva, supra note 23, at 454–55 (2012).
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vestment-grade rating signifies that the security is liquid and
creditworthy.136 The SEC incorporated credit ratings into the regula-
tory framework and, perhaps unintentionally, signaled their signifi-
cance to the investor public.137 This change also made the NRSROs
“gatekeepers”138: Non-registered rating firms may issue securities’
ratings, but those ratings cannot be used as a substitute under the regu-
latory standards.139
The use of investment-grade rating had a spillover effect. Federal
and state regulations required certain investment decisions to use
NRSRO ratings and treat those investments favorably;140 this reduced
the costs of capital and thus made debt cheaper.141 Specifically, the
banking net capital rules also incentivized banks to invest in NRSRO
securities due to the costs, thereby raising the importance of credit
ratings to issuers.142
In the field of credit ratings, the still fragmented regulatory sys-
tem governing banking and securities resulted in incongruent and inef-
ficient regulation. “Modernization” of the financial services industry
allowed a single firm to operate banking, securities, and insurance
subsidiaries.143 However, monitoring and supervision of these firms
136. Dodd-Frank required the SEC to study the frequency of credit ratings in other
sectors. In order to help de-emphasize the role of CRAs, section 939A of the Dodd-
Frank Act prohibits the use of credit ratings for a number of statutory purposes. David
B.H. Martin & Matthew C. Franker, Rating Agency Regulation After the Dodd-Frank
Act: A Mid-Course Review, 12 INSIGHTS 3 (2011). The Dodd-Frank Act allows civil
remedies against credit rating agencies, thereby rescinding the exemption that such
agencies previously enjoyed for rating statements made in the prospectuses.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B) (2008).
138. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308–11 (2004) (describing the
NRSRO’s reputational capital in issuing accurate ratings as one of two essential “gate-
keeper” functions).
139. Moody’s, S&P’s, and Fitch Ratings, often referred to as the “Big Three,” domi-
nate the market because they issue over ninety-five percent of outstanding ratings on
U.S. debt securities, qualifying those securities for favorable regulatory treatment.
Jack T. Gannon, Jr., Let’s Help the Credit Rating Agencies Get It Right: A Simple
Way to Alleviate a Flawed Industry Model, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1015, 1020
(2012).
140. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 6–9 (2003) [here-
inafter 2003 SEC REPORT].
141. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Release No. 34-7114, File No. S7-15-11 (Dec. 27, 2013).
142. Under Basel II, banks were allowed to invest in NRSRO securities. See Patrick
Van Roy, Credit Ratings and the Standardised Approach to Credit Risk in Basel II 13
(Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No. 517, 2005).
143. Robert W. Dixon, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act: Why
Reform in the Financial Services Industry Was Necessary and the Act’s Projected
Effects on Community Banking, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 671, 688 (2001).
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remain separate: the banking industry relies on direct supervision and
enforcement by the regulatory agencies, while the securities industry
relies, to some extent, on self-regulation. Thus, innovations in the se-
curities market made it difficult for banking regulators to effectively
monitor compliance of new financial products with the rules. In partic-
ular, prior to the subprime crisis, the rapid growth of new derivative
instruments posed a problem for regulators.144 As discussed in Part III,
as “gatekeepers,” credit rating agencies have frequently failed to insu-
late the market from abuse, but have neither suffered from reputational
risks nor received closer supervision.145
2. Banking Regulation of Mortgages
a. Banking Deregulation
After the 1929 market crash, the widespread fear of bank failures
forced banks to choose between engaging in simple lending and be-
coming investment banks to conduct securities underwriting and deal-
ing.146 Consequently, Congress prohibited banks from “principally
engaging” in non-banking activities, such as the securities and insur-
ance business.147 Congress then created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Fund (FDIC), which guaranteed consumer deposit accounts up to a
144. See Gubler, supra note 51, at 67–68 (discussing how new financial markets
emerge when banks created new financial products). As one author explains,
[d]erivatives are financial instruments that derive their value on their
claim to another asset, such as an option to purchase a good or a futures
contract on a good. Derivatives can be used to hedge against risk, protect-
ing against a decline in value of the underlying asset. Alternatively, they
can be used for simple speculation, to profit off an expected change in
value. Derivatives do not involve the actual transfer of assets, so a buyer
often does not own the underlying asset.
MATTHEW SHERMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., A SHORT HISTORY OF FINAN-
CIAL DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2009), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.
org/a771/53a1111a550a99bf2b116621ceb7a445a1b4.pdf?_ga=2.264467783.9711055
15.1503197195-1271500028.1503197195.
145. The failures of credit ratings on corporate bonds issued by LTC Capital,
WorldCom, and Enron resulted in insignificant adjustments in the ratings methodol-
ogy. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets—Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 630 (1999)
(arguing that credit rating agencies should be able to sell regulatory licenses based on
credit risk spreads). To continuously influence the market, rating agencies are said to
depend on their “reputational capital,” or their reputation for objectivity and accuracy.
See discussion infra Part III.
146. In 1933, Congress fundamentally reformed banking with the Glass-Steagall
Act. Glass-Steagall also established a system of deposit insurance for consumers with
the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (1933).
147. Id. § 378 (1933).
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certain level, restoring depositor confidence.148 Congress also created
the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) Board to oversee savings and
loan associations, known as thrifts, which were designed to fund mort-
gage loans and encourage savings.149
After the 1929 market crash, Congress restricted the interest rates
charged by banks on deposit accounts.150 In the 1980s, with interest
rates soaring, Congress de-regulated the financial institutions indus-
try.151 However, an exception was made for savings and loans
(“S&Ls”), which specialized in encouraging mortgage lending within
local communities. Thrift institutions were allowed to offer deposit
accounts interest at slightly higher rates.152 The Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 re-
moved interest rate ceilings on deposits, and eliminated the thrifts’
interest rate advantage over banks.153
Such legislation was needed because S&Ls experienced financial
distress due to a mismatch of their asset portfolio. Because S&Ls spe-
cialized in taking in deposits in the short-term and making mortgage
loans in the long-term, they were vulnerable to the costs of high inter-
est rates.154 The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
allowed S&Ls to act more like banks and less like specialized mort-
148. Banking Act of 1935, § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 228. In 1936, the Comptroller exer-
cised authority under the 1935 Act to prohibit banks from purchasing speculative-
grade securities, as defined in manuals published by rating agencies. U.S. Comptroller
of the Currency, Purchase of Investment Securities, and Further Defining the Term
“Investment Securities” as Used in Section 5136 of the Revised Statutes as Amended
by the “Banking Act of 1935,” § II (Feb. 15, 1936).
149. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1421, Pub. L. No. 72–304, 47
Stat. 725 (1932).
150. Under Regulation Q of the Banking Act of 1933, savings accounts were capped
at 5.25%, and time deposits were limited to between 5.75% and 7.75%, depending on
maturity. Checking accounts were restricted to an interest rate of zero. 12 C.F.R. 217
(1986).
151. See BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE, U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY 137-71, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Documents/Blueprint.pdf (discussing the public benefits of deregulation).
152. Thrifts were allowed to charge a quarter-percent higher interest than banks. 12
C.F.R. § 217.7 (1980).
153. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-1221, 94 Stat. 132.
154. With high inflation and competitive pressure for deposits pushing up the inter-
est rates they had to pay, most thrift institutions reported large losses in the early
1980s. Net worth of the entire industry approached zero, falling from 5.3% of assets
in 1980 to 0.5% in 1982. See 1 FDIC, Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to
Banking, in A History of the 80s: Lessons for the Future 169 (1999), http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf.
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gage lending institutions.155 Although the legislation intended to bene-
fit specifically the thrift industry, it unfortunately allowed these firms
to enter into new financial territory with new risks.
Also passed in 1982, the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Par-
ity Act lifted restrictions on mortgage loans with exotic features, such
as adjustable-rate and interest-only mortgages.156 The lure of Alterna-
tive A-paper (“Alt-A”) loans157 to borrowers came from their low
“teaser” rates, which reset at higher interest rates after a few years.158
Perhaps the most significant deregulation legislation was the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (“Gramm-Leach-
Bliley”).159 The Act repealed the Glass-Steagall Act and lifted all re-
strictions on financial institutions engaging in banking, securities, and
insurance operations.160 National commercial banks were permitted to
consolidate across state lines, essentially paving the way for the “too
big to fail” mega-bank.161
Finally, the parity legislation, which gave private mortgage-
backed securities the same exemptions as government-backed securi-
ties, led to the growth of the subprime mortgage securitization market.
The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984162
155. The statute allowed S&Ls to engage in commercial loans up to ten percent of
assets and offer a new account to compete directly with market mutual funds. Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 325, 96 Stat.
1500 (1982).
156. The Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA) was a part of the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 226, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1982).
157. “Alt-A loans generally are larger in size than subprime loans and have signifi-
cantly higher credit quality, with the majority having FICO scores above 680. For this
reason, Alt-A loans are sometimes referred to as ‘near prime.’” THOMAS P. LEMKE,
GERALD T. LINS & MARIE E. PICARD, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES §3:8 (2016).
158. SHERMAN, supra note 144, at 12. R
159. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6701, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
160. The capital limitations on banks, especially in the southeast, kept them from
growing and being competitive. Hugh McColl, CEO of the North Carolina National
Bank Corp. was among those who lobbied to drop the restrictions on interstate bank-
ing. Thomas D. Hills, The Rise of Southern Banking and the Disparities Among the
States Following the Southeastern Regional Banking Compact, 11 N.C. BANKING
INST. 57, 87–88 (2007) (quoting Kenneth Cline, McColl Downplays Starring Role in
Long Campaign for Banking, AM. BANKER, Sept. 15, 1994, at 4).
161. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks
of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 997–1002 (1992). Professor Wilmarth
lists four reasons for Congress’ preservation of the “too big to fail doctrine”: avoiding
a spillover run; credit disruption; preserving the viability of smaller correspondent
banks; and the stability of domestic and international payment systems; and all major
countries implicitly follow the doctrine. Id. at 997–1002.
162. Act of Oct. 3, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (2006) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78g).
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(SMMEA) revolutionized the private mortgage-backed securities mar-
ket by exempting private-label mortgage-backed securities (“private-
label MBS”) from securities and tax laws.163 Specifically, private-la-
bel MBS were exempted from registration requirements, prohibitions
on forward trading,164 state blue sky laws,165 double taxation for cer-
tain entities under the tax code,166 and exemptions allowed invest-
ments by FDIC-insured banks.167 Significantly, SMMEA also
required the exempted securities to receive a rating of AA or higher
from a credit rating agency.168 The legislation effectively lowered the
costs of issuance and created liquidity and “trillions of dollars” of
mortgage credit over the years.169 Arguably, SMMEA both furthered
an expansion of mortgage credit and created more opportunities for
abuse.170
These changes led to heavy investment in alternative mort-
gages.171 Alt-A loans were in high demand and proved to be complex
financial arrangements that were difficult for borrowers to under-
163. The legislative intent was to create parity between the private-label market and
the government-sponsored entities (GSEs). Id.; see also infra note 174 (explaining
GSEs). For example, the sponsoring legislator, Senator Tower, supported SMMEA
because of the future needed liquidity in the mortgage market. Secondary Mortgage
Market Enhancement Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 1 (1983) (statement of
Sen. John Tower); see Havard, supra note 113, at 746 n.34.
164. See § 102 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78g) (removing restrictions on forward trad-
ing of private-label MBS under the Exchange Act § 7(c) Regulation T).
165. Id. § 106 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1).
166. Id. § 104 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78k).
167. Id. § 105 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)); id. § 107 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1757). Prior to the repeal of Glass-Steagall, this statute exempted private label MBS
from registration for FDIC-insured banks. Glass-Steagall Act § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24
(2000).
168. See § 78c(a)(41).
169. See The Housing Decline: Extent of the Problem and Potential Remedies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Michael
Decker, Senior Managing Director, Research & Public Policy, Securities Industry &
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)).
170. Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61
FLA. L. REV. 827, 858–59 (2009) (defending SMMEA as “Reagan-era legislation”
that is falsely labeled as contributing to the housing bubble).
171. Lenders were allowed to offer adjustable-rate mortgages beginning in 1982. In
1980, federal legislation preempted state-imposed interest rate caps. After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, residential mortgage interest was the only tax-deductible interest
allowed for consumer loans. This encouraged home equity withdrawal as a new type
of consumer loan. “Cashout” refinancing of a mortgage became a preferred means of
financing home improvements and personal consumption. See Cathy Lesser Mans-
field, The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions:
Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473
(2000).
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stand.172 Mortgage lenders also targeted lower-income, higher-risk
borrowers with relatively low credit ratings for this subset of subprime
loans. As these markets became more profitable, the mortgage indus-
try aggressively pushed these non-conforming loans onto consum-
ers.173 By 2006, the subprime market had surpassed the conforming
loan market in size.174
b. Vertical Integration
Two decades prior to the financial crisis, the dramatic changes in
the legal and regulatory landscape of financial institutions allowed
banks to become vertically integrated and facilitate a vertical supply
chain.175 For mortgages, vertical integration of banks increased availa-
bility of credit directly linked to the fees generated in the securitiza-
tion process.176
As banks became more integrated, they began manufacturing se-
curities. Contrary to the idea that securitization encouraged banks to
pass risks onto other parties, banks produced and held a large amount
172. In 1970, Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) packaged
the first mortgage-backed securities in the nationwide push to foster homeownership.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) and the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) soon followed suit. These GSEs bought
up mortgage loans to facilitate a secondary market. The securities carried an implicit
guarantee from the federal government, and they were required to conform to under-
writing standards that ensured loan quality and limited risk. See SHERMAN, supra note
144, at 12. Innovation in the mortgage finance market produced products that borrow- R
ers were unfamiliar with. For example, Alt-A loans mixed aspects of options and
futures and insurance contracts, and they allowed financial firms to bet on or hedge
against all sorts of possible outcomes. Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Univer-
sal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and The Origins Of The Subprime Financial
Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1016 (2009). CDOs played a significant role in the
subprime crisis. See Gubler, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
173. As has been documented numerous times, although sixty-one percent of sub-
prime borrowers had credit scores high enough to qualify them for conventional mort-
gages, they received subprime loans. See Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime
Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2007), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB119662974358911035.html.
174. In 2001, there were twice as many prime loans as there were subprime loans.
See FOOTE, supra note 13.
175. See Claudine Gartenberg & Lamar Pierce, Subprime Governance: Agency Costs
in Vertically Integrated Banks and the 2008 Mortgage Crisis, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
302, 329–308 (2017) (discussing the negative aspects of vertical integration and mon-
itoring in Washington Mutual securitizations).
176. Jill M. Hendrickson, The Long and Bumpy Road to Glass-Steagall Reform: A
Historical and Evolutionary Analysis of Banking Legislation, 60 AM J. ECON. & SOC.
849, 849–874 (2001). Two authors argue that diversification allowed banks to change
their profit structure from lending to generating fees. See Robert DeYoung & Tara
Rice, How Do Banks Make Money? A Variety of Business Strategies, ECON. PERSP.,
4Q/2003, at 34–48.
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of mortgage-backed securities and CDOs.177 Mass production of fi-
nancial instruments not only generated a steady supply of mortgages,
but also guaranteed fees throughout the securitization process. Firms
adopted a vertical integration structure, which required holding the
mortgages instead of selling them. This also increased the firms’ loss
exposure if the mortgages defaulted. “[B]y 2007, there were a small
number of large financial firms mass-producing mortgage-backed se-
curities products in vertically-integrated pipelines whereby firms
originated mortgages, securitized them, sold them off to investors, and
were investors themselves in these products.”178
The decline of interest rates after 2001 increased the demand for
mortgage-backed securities, which were viewed as a safe investment
with high returns. Vertically integrated banks developed “pipelines”
and made record profits by earning fees throughout the securitization
process and by making investments in these securities. When the mar-
ket changed in 2004, vertically integrated banks expanded their origi-
nation and securitization of nonconventional mortgages, including
subprime mortgages.179 There were two distinct advantages for banks
to do so: First, subprime mortgages offered higher interest rates and
returns than conventional mortgages, although they were riskier. Sec-
ond, because the mortgages were risker, banks re-securitized the sub-
prime mortgage-backed securities and created CDOs. These financial
products allowed banks to package tranches of mortgage-backed se-
curities, which were the riskiest and the most difficult to sell, into
bonds to make more money.180
Pipelines, sometimes called the “industrial control” business
model, required constant manufacture of the financial products for
sale or leverage. Banks increased the volume of risky mortgage-
177. Viral Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, 107 J. FIN. ECON.
514 (2013) (discussing banks engaged in regulatory arbitrage setting up “asset-backed
commercial paper” (ABCP) conduits that reduced regulatory capital requirements but
retained risks on their balance sheets); Diamond & Rajan, supra note 91, at 609.
178. Countrywide Financial was the originator of the vertical integration pipeline,
which generated large profits and led to its industry-wide use. Neil Fligstein & Adam
Goldstein, The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and the Industrial Roots of the
Mortgage Meltdown 5–6 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://escholarship.
org/uc/item/2zx8r7fb.
179. Gartenberg & Pierce, supra note 162, at 37.
180. One prominent and illustrative case of this occurred at Goldman Sachs, which
used its privileged information about the underlying risk of a particular CDO to bet
against it on the investment end while continuing to profit from its production. Brown,
supra note 22, at 85 (quoting Charlie Gasparino, Goldman Already a Step Ahead of
FinReg, FOX BUSINESS (July 27, 2010), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/
07/27/goldman-step-ahead-finreg) (discussing Goldman Sachs’s profiteering scheme
of mixing its “proprietary” stock-trading operations with other assets).
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backed securities in order to produce fees, with little regard for the
possibility of default.181 Riskier mortgages were the best product for
this model because the mortgages were originated, securitized, and
manufactured into CDOs. 182 As a result, vertical production of loans
undermined the quality of subprime mortgages.183 Large holdings of
risky mortgages became the largest market segment for many verti-
cally integrated firms and eventually contributed to those firms’
failure.184
One group of scholars views the development of mortgage
securitization markets as the industrial control mechanism enabling
these integrated financial firms to make money.185 As discussed be-
low, this “markets as politics” approach explains the unprecedented
access to credit given to borrowers who usually did not have access to
credit and neighborhoods that banks had historically redlined.
c. Opportunistic Securitization
Subprime lending becomes predatory when loan terms are abu-
sive.186 “Although not all subprime loans are predatory, nearly all
predatory loans are subprime.” 187 Predatory lending violated con-
sumer and anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination in
housing finance. Credit became abundant in minority communities
that were historically denied access to credit.188 Lenders ignored the
fact that noncompliant loans adversely impacted minority and low-
181. Id. at 32.
182. Neil Fligstein & Alexander Roehrkasse, All the Incentives Were Wrong: Oppor-
tunism and the Financial Crisis 27–31 (Feb. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/csls/Fligstein_Paper_CSLS_23_Sep13(1).
pdf.
183. Fligstein & Goldstein, supra note 175, at 32.
184. Vertically integrated firms both had to continue to produce risky mortgages for
mortgage-backed securities and CDOs to maintain operations and revenue. These se-
curities were difficult to sell because the market for mortgage-backed securities and
CDOs was coming to an end. Id. at 33.
185. Neil Fligstein, Politics as Markets, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 665 (1996).
186. States with strong predatory lending laws have reduced the number of subprime
loans. See WEI LI & KEITH S. ERNST, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE BEST
VALUE IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET: STATE PREDATORY LENDING REFORMS 12, 17
(2006), http://responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr010-State_Effects-0206.pdf.
187. Arielle L. Katzman, A Round Peg for A Square Hole: The Mismatch Between
Subprime Borrowers and Federal Mortgage Remedies, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 501
(2009).
188. See generally Andre Douglas Pond, Racial Coding and the Financial Market
Crisis, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 41.
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income borrowers, and did not take any measures to audit loans for
compliance.189
The “ball of money” that funded predatory loans is subject to
laws prohibiting discrimination in housing finance.190 Lenders in the
financing chain had a duty to monitor the use of funds to comply with
fair lending laws. Non-bank mortgage lenders secured money from
Wall Street to fund their loans. Wall Street investment firms either
securitized the subprime mortgages they purchased and sold the in-
come stream to investors, or became subprime lenders by purchasing a
non-bank financial institution.191 The connections between mortgage
lenders, brokers, banks, Wall Street firms, and predatory lending fund-
ing are integral to the supply of subprime credit, and, for the most
part, have been left unaddressed in post-financial crisis reforms.
III.
TRANSPARENT SECURITIZATION
Although the private market for asset-backed securities slowed
after the turmoil of the financial crisis, there is reason to anticipate its
return.192 The return of private-label mortgage funding will require a
market stable enough to attract investments and liquid enough to pro-
vide a continuous supply of affordable financing. Since the crisis,
189. See Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1191, 1208 (2011) (explaining how Delaware fiduciary law protects even grossly neg-
ligent board members of financial firms incorporated in that state, who failed to moni-
tor the funding and purchasing of predatory loans in violation of fair lending laws).
190. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race
throughout all phases of the residential lending process. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631
(2006). Offering different and less favorable loan terms based on the race of the bor-
rower, as was common in targeting minority borrowers for predatory loans, is also a
violation of the FHA. Id. § 3605.
191. See GARY DYMSKI, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY, UN-
DERSTANDING THE SUBPRIME CRISIS: INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND THEORETICAL
VIEWS, IN THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING AND CREDIT 17 (2010), http://www.kirwan
institute.osu.edu/reports/2010/02_2010_SubprimeCrisisTheory_Dymski.pdf.
192. Diana Olick, Private-Label Mortgage Bonds Are Rising from the Grave, CNBC
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/20/private-label-mortgage-bonds-
are-rising-from-the-grave.html (explaining the new requirements for mortgages that
fall outside the strict guidelines of government-backed securitizations). The value of
subprime mortgages before the financial crisis was approximately $1.3 trillion in 2008
and almost tripled to $7.3 trillion by 2007, with securitized subprime mortgages in-
creasing from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006. Between 2004 and 2006, the share of
subprime mortgages relative to total originations ranged from 18% to 21%, although it
was less than 10% from 2001 to 2003. See DEP’T OF STATISTICS, U.N.C. CHAPEL
HILL, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 20 (2012), http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/cji/fys/
2012/Subprime%20mortgage%20crisis.pdf
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transparency in complex securities ratings has become essential.193
The conflict of interest reflected by the issuer-pays model requires an
analysis of the efficacy of securitization from the perspective of bor-
rowers and investors.194 Misaligned incentives of originators, ware-
house lenders, issuers, and credit rating agencies in the mortgage
securitization process are diametrically opposed to borrowers’ and in-
vestors’ expectations of sustainability.195 If the issuer-pays model re-
mains, credit rating agencies must conduct due diligence in order to
counter-balance the conflicts-of-interests inherent in the model.
The proposals in this Article support the notion that a robust
mortgage finance market is sustainable in all of its facets. Several
facts support this argument: Private label funding, though in decline,
will at some point, return to mortgage securitization.196 Regulatory
193. Investors sued the three major credit rating agencies for assigning inflated eval-
uations to subprime residential mortgage-backed securities. With the credibility of
their credit ratings challenged by the subprime crisis, S&P adopted new policies to
improve transparency and accuracy. See S&P Announces New Actions to Enhance
Independence, Strengthen the Ratings Process, and Increase Transparency to Better
Serve Global Markets, CBONDS (Feb. 7, 2008), http://cbonds.com/news/item/391180.
For example, S&P agreed to a $1.37 billion settlement in February 2015, and also
paid $125 million to the nation’s largest pension fund, the California Public Employ-
ees’ Retirement System (CPERS) and $80 million in a settlement with the SEC. While
these sums combined are more than ten times larger than any other ratings agency-
related settlement, critics argue that they represent a mere slap on the wrist for S&P,
which as part of the deal was not forced to admit to any criminal wrongdoing. James
Rufus Koren, CalPERS Settles With Moody’s For $130 Million in Ratings Case, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-calpers-moodys-settle-
ment-20160309-story.html; Rebecca Moore, S&P Agrees to Compensate California
Pension Funds, PLANSPONSOR (Feb. 03, 2015), http://www.plansponsor.com/stan-
dard-and-poors-agrees-to-compensate-california-pension-funds; Evan Perez & Ben
Rooney, S&P To Pay $1.4 Billion To Settle U.S. Charges, CNN (Feb. 3, 2015), http://
money.cnn.com/2015/02/03/investing/sp-mortgage-settlement/index.html; The Credit
Rating Controversy, Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 19, 2015), https://
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/credit-rating-controversy.
194. See Schwarcz, supra note 21 (discussing the conflicts of credit ratings and how
they contributed to the financial crisis).
195. See generally Benjamin H. Brownlow, Rating Agency Reform: Preserving the
Registered Market for Asset-Backed Securities, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 126
(2011) (identifying the issuer pays model as having inherent conflicts due to revenues
from ratings and in creating financial products); Peng Liu & Lan Shi, Sponsor-Under-
writer Affiliation and the Performance of Non-Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities
(Aug. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://finance.business.uconn.edu/
wp-content/uploads/sites/723/2014/08/Sponsor-Underwriter-Affiliation.pdf (conclud-
ing that there was a lack of screening in mortgage securitizations when there was a
sponsor-underwriter affiliation).
196. Private securitizations since the financial crisis have declined dramatically indi-
cating further evidence of the need for reform. See LAURIE GOODMAN, URBAN INST.,
THE REBIRTH OF SECURITIZATION: WHERE IS THE PRIVATE LABEL MORTGAGE MAR-
KET? 1 (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/65901/2000375-
The-Rebirth-of-Securitization.pdf (advocating for a reform and return of a nonprime
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complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, and the lack of reform in the gov-
ernment-sponsored secondary mortgage markets contributed to the
current stall in the market.197 Identifying and clarifying the impedi-
ments to securitization will help this market sector to regenerate prof-
its. This Article further presumes the need for a sustainable and robust
subprime securitized market. Subprime mortgages expand the housing
finance market, offer attractive returns on investments, and provide
non-traditional but qualified borrowers with access to credit. Requir-
ing credit rating agencies to conduct due diligence would incorporate
quality standards into the ratings process and deter abuse. This is a
better approach than narrowing the availability of mortgage credit. Af-
ter a brief discussion of why the Dodd-Frank reforms are limited, this
Article presents a proposal for credit rating agencies to conduct due
diligence and explains how such due diligence would fill the void in
the credit rating agency reform. Ultimately, borrowers and investors
will benefit from the increasing accountability and transparency in the
ratings process.
A. Dodd-Frank’s Limited Response
Dodd-Frank required two administrative agencies, the SEC and
the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB),198 to
review the securitization process and protect borrowers and investors.
1. The Qualified Residential Mortgage
Congress recognized the difficulties that predatory subprime
mortgages caused borrowers and enacted rules that required adminis-
trative agencies to define responsible lending. Dodd-Frank requires
that lenders verify income and provide accurate documentation on
mortgages.199 It further directs federal regulators to define a very safe
securitization market). Current GSE reform proposals recommend a variety of ap-
proaches, with some recommending that the secondary market have no government
involvement at all. Susan Wachter & Patricia A. McCoy, A New Coalescence in the
Housing Finance Reform Debate, 4 U. PA. WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE ISSUE
BRIEF, June 2016, at 6 (analyzing recent GSE reform proposals recommending cen-
tralization and concentrated control of GSEs’ infrastructure and credit risk).
197. Congressional action on proposed reform bills have failed to reach a consensus.
For a discussion of several GSE reform proposals, see generally Eric S. Anderson,
Maintaining Capital in the Secondary Mortgage Market: Housing Finance Reform
and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 53, 55 (2015).
198. See Dodd-Frank at §1898.
199. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2012) (“Regulation Z”). Section 1026.43(c) describes the
requirements for making ability-to-repay determinations, including consideration of
eight underwriting factors: 1) current or reasonably expected income or assets; 2)
current employment status; 3) the monthly payment on the covered transaction; 4) the
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“qualified residential mortgage” (QRM) that would be considered low
risk for lenders and borrowers alike.200 For mortgages that do not meet
QRM standards, Dodd-Frank requires originators to retain five percent
of the credit risk.201
QRM essentially mandates an underwriting standard. Critics of
the rule argue that accurate, comprehensive, and consistent reporting
of mortgage attributes largely obviates the need for a QRM stan-
dard.202 They assert that investors already receive sufficient informa-
tion from loan disclosures, FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, and
debt-to-income ratios, with the QRM requirements dis-incentivizing
investors from scrutinizing transactions.203 Finally, such critics argue
it may be fallacious to equate QRMs with investment-grade
securities.204
2. Risk Retention
The risk retention rule faces similar criticism. For mortgages that
do not meet the QRM standards, Dodd-Frank requires originators to
retain five percent of the credit risk.205 The risk retention rule is a
regulatory response to the moral hazard problem, the rationale being
that, if issuers retain credit risk, they will have greater incentive to
monitor loans and create better-quality mortgages, thus protecting in-
monthly payment on any simultaneous loan; 5) the monthly payment for mortgage-
related obligations; 6) current debt obligations, alimony, and child support; 7) the
monthly debt-to-income ratio or residual income; and 8) credit history. Creditors must
generally use reasonably reliable third-party records to verify the information they use
to evaluate the factors. Id.
200. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 244 (2014) (“Regulation RR”).
201. Dodd-Frank at § 1898.
202. A market is developing for non-qualified mortgage products. See Stephen Orn-
stein, Subprime Makes a Comeback, Despite Dodd-Frank’s Impediments, NAT’L
MORTG. NEWS (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/voices/
subprime-makes-a-comeback-despite-dodd-franks-impediments-1066512-1.html.
203. See Thomas J. White, The 20% Solution: Risk Retention Will Help Reprivatize
Mortgages, AM. BANKER (July 5, 2011), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
the-20-solution-risk-retention-will-help-reprivatize-mortgages (positing that down
payments are best risk retention rules because investors trust neither home buyers nor
investors).
204. See Jeff Brown, Why Investors Own Private Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 18, 2016), http://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/
2016-07-18/why-investors-own-private-mortgage-backed-securities.
205. There is a burgeoning market for nonprime residential market. See DIMITRIS
KARAPIPERIS, NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y RE-
SEARCH, FINANCING HOME OWNERSHIP: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF MORTGAGE
SECURITIZATION PUBLIC POLICY, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND CRISES 45 (2012),
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_120812_white_paper_financing_home_owner
ship.pdf.
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vestors. Contrary to popular opinion, mortgage intermediaries retained
a lot of “skin in the game.”206
The risk retention rule is problematic for at least two reasons:
First, the rule could expose banks to more losses. As mentioned
above, banks held securitized mortgage loans on their books. When
institutions failed, those loans had implicit recourse, which means that
deposit insurance funds absorbed some of the losses.207 Second, the
policy presumes that investors who purchase mortgage-backed securi-
ties are naı¨ve and have not effectively negotiated for protection.208
The private investment market is replete with contractual arrange-
ments that protect sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Stan-
dard contractual arrangements in purchase contracts bind issuers to
certain criteria and allow investors to opt out of the contracts under
some conditions.209 Monitoring and enforcing these agreements is bet-
ter than exposing the insurance fund to liability.
3. SEC Rule 15Ga-2
The SEC responded to transparency concerns surrounding mort-
gage-backed securities in its recently released Rule 15Ga-2.210 The
206. See Acharya et al., supra note 174, at 3–4, 16–31.
207. See Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 90, at 1542–47 (positing that a regula-
tory risk retention requirement is not useful for financial institutions because it implic-
itly relies on the naı¨ve-investors theory and does not address the origination risks that
occurred during a housing bubble).
208. Cheryl D. Block, A Continuum Approach To Systemic Risk And Too-Big-To-
Fail, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 315 (2012) (arguing that prudential
regulation should be applied to systemically important institutions to avoid a govern-
ment bailout).
209. Investment contracts provide investors with an opportunity to opt out of a deal
if certain conditions and obligations, such as representations and warranties, are not
met. Seth Chertok, The Rise of the Dodd-Frank Act: How Dodd-Frank Will Likely
Impact Private Equity Real Estate, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 97, 141 (2013) (discussing
investment contracts in the context of subprime mortgages).
210. Rule 15Ga-2 took effect on June 15, 2016. It implements Section 15E(s)(4)3 of
the Exchange Act, which was added by Section 932(a)(8) of Dodd-Frank, 15 U.S.C.
780-7(s)(4). This Section regulates disclosure of third-party due diligence services
employed in connection with the issuance of asset-backed securities. See Press Re-
lease, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rules to Increase Transparency and
Improve Integrity of Credit Ratings (May 18, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-113.htm. The new regulations supplement the former regulations in sev-
eral respects:
(i) require NRSRO reports on internal controls over the ratings process,
restrict sales and marketing activities from influencing the production of
ratings, and require reports to the SEC and “look-back” when an entity
subject to a rating employs a person who previously worked for the NR-
SRO; (ii) require greater disclosure of data on rating performance; (iii)
require procedures when a rating firm adopts or revises rating procedures
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Rule mandates the release of any information about the credit quality
of mortgage loans that NRSROs have received.211 Specifically, the
findings and conclusions in any third-party firms’ due diligence re-
ports on loan quality must be available to investors.212 NRSROs must
attach to each credit rating publication a form containing certain quali-
tative and quantitative information about that credit rating.213 The dis-
closure requirement applies to any certifications of third-party due
diligence services with respect to mortgage-backed securities.214 The
underlying rationale is that investors will have direct access to the full
range of information that goes into the ratings.215
Informed investors will revive the secondary mortgage market
when they are confident that information about the securities is thor-
ough, clear, reliable, and readily available. Dodd-Frank reforms bring
awareness to banking and securities regulatory issues that overlap, but
these reforms stop short of regulating the market in a consistent
way.216 The proposal discussed below emphasizes the need for sys-
and methodologies, and disclosure of certain information to accompany
the publication of a rating; (iv) require third-parties retained for due dili-
gence related to asset-backed securities to provide a certification contain-
ing specified information to the NRSRO that is producing a rating for the
security; (v) establishing training, experience and competence standards
and a testing program for NRSRO analysts; and (vi) require internal poli-
cies to assure consistent use of rating symbols.
17 C.F.R. 240.15Ga-2 (2014).
211. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 232, 240, 249 & 249b (2014).
212. Id. § 232.
213. Id. 
214. Under the new amendments, “rating action” includes preliminary credit ratings,
initial credit ratings, upgrades and downgrades of credit ratings, and affirmations and
withdrawals of credit ratings if they are the result of a review using the NRSRO’s
procedures and methodologies for determining credit ratings. Rule 17g-10 dictates the
specifics of the third-party certification Section 15E(s)(4)(B)(10) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(s)(4)(B). It requires third-party due diligence services providers
to deliver the required written certification required on a Form ABS Due Diligence-
15E signed by an individual duly authorized to make such certification on behalf of
the third-party due diligence provider. Id.
215. The Rule 15Ga-2 summary report includes: 1) credit reviews that assess the
extent to which the loans in the transaction conform to the originator’s lending guide-
lines; 2) property valuation reviews that assess whether information in the loans’ files
reasonably support the loans’ appraised values; 3) compliance reviews that assess
whether the loans were originated in accordance with federal, state and local laws; and
4) data integrity reviews that assess whether the data provided by the issuer is the
same as the information in the loan files. 17 C.F.R. 240.15Ga-2.
216. See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of
the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 Hofstra L. Rev. 25, 28–29 n.17 (2014)
(advocating for dynamic financial regulation given changes in the market); see also
Foote, supra note 13.
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tematic oversight of housing finance by monitoring secondary mar-
kets’ compliance with federal consumer protection laws.
B. The Duty of Due Diligence
The credit ratings agencies’ interaction with the loosely-regulated
securitization framework facilitated a market failure that will happen
again unless steps are taken to stabilize the securitization process.
While the SEC must confer the NRSRO status, prior to the financial
crisis, the SEC exercised little ongoing regulatory review of the evalu-
ative functions of credit rating agencies.217 Consequently, these rating
agencies were essentially self-regulating.
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to prescribe the format for certifi-
cation that third-party due diligence servicers must provide to each
NRSRO, which produces a credit rating for an asset-backed secur-
ity.218 It also establishes a new requirement that issuers and underwrit-
ers of asset-backed securities make publicly available the findings and
conclusions of any third-party due diligence report obtained by the
issuer or underwriter.219 These reforms provide necessary oversight,
but do not go far enough to ensure substantively accurate credit ratings
for investor confidence and market protection.
As an administrative agency, the SEC receives deference in de-
termining the method used in, and compensation of, the ratings pro-
cess. Yet the agency is also charged with designing and overseeing a
system that is consistent with the purpose of the ratings function.220
The SEC’s primary responsibility regarding the ratings process is to
ensure that information is accurately disseminated to market partici-
pants. In that regard, the SEC is responsible for confirming that the
ratings model is accessible, usable, and clear, and that issuers are able
217. Dodd-Frank required the SEC to establish an Office of Credit Ratings and com-
plete annual examinations of each NRSRO. Once established, this office will be re-
sponsible for administering the rules of SEC in certain areas, promoting accuracy in
credit ratings, and conducting annual examinations of each NRSRO. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
7(p)(3).
218. See Dodd-Frank § 932(a)(8) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(4)(C)) (adding
new paragraph (s)(4)(C) to section 15E of the Exchange Act).
219. See Dodd-Frank § 932(a)(8) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(4)(A)).
220. Under the Chevron doctrine, a court must grant deference to executive agen-
cies, including the SEC, in interpreting a statute it administers. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Section 939F of Dodd-Frank
requires the SEC to study the rating process for structured finance products and asso-
ciated conflicts of interest, the feasibility of an assignment system, metrics to deter-
mine the accuracy of ratings, and alternative means for compensating NRSROs. See
Dodd-Frank §§ 931–939H.
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to determine the applicable fees and compensation.221 Moreover, the
SEC should oversee the rating models to ensure that they work as
intended.222 Specifically, as discussed below, the SEC should assess
whether the ratings model enables credit rating agencies to conduct
independent internal control.
The SEC is well aware that credit rating agencies do not engage
in due diligence.223 Prior to the financial crisis, due diligence was a
part of the underwriting process, before originators sold loans, not a
part of the ratings process.224 Due diligence should be mandatory now
for at least two reasons: First, voluntary due diligence as an estab-
lished industry practice ended as soon as underwriters, who wanted
evade the negative opinions of third-parties, no longer considered it
feasible. Credit rating agencies were fully aware of this decline in
creditworthiness standards.225 Second, rating agencies have a slim
profit margin in providing ratings for mortgage-backed securities.
Mandatory due diligence will allow rating agencies to increase their
fees across the board to cover the costs of the additional neutral exam-
inations.226 Overall, mandatory due diligence will achieve several
public policy goals, including by increasing transparency in the securi-
tization process and assuring the credibility of information used in rat-
ing models.
221. See generally John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide
Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and A Proposal
for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 148–53.
222. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secon-
dary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 468 (2009) (suggesting
rules that regulations addressing compensation, conflicts of interest and accuracy of
ratings signals will address CRAs’ weaknesses).
223. See, e.g., 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 138, at 35.
224. An “underwriter” describes “the person that performs due diligence—or, in the
case of continuous due diligence, to describe the person who fails to perform such due
diligence.” Joseph K. Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-Envisioning Under-
writers’ Continuous Due Diligence After Worldcom, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2001,
2041–42 (2009). Underwriters face strict liability for material misstatements or omis-
sions in the registration statement. Id.
225. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling
Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 342–43 (2003) (discussing the complicit willfulness
against issuing downgrades and the decline in creditworthiness among the rating
agencies).
226. One commentator argues that imposing liability upon credit rating agencies for
negligence might increase the accuracy of their ratings. See Gregory Husisian, What
Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials? An Analysis of
Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 431 (1990) (positing that
credit rating agencies are the “least-cost avoider,” have the “optimum level of care,”
and are best at “risk-spreading”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-2\NYL203.txt unknown Seq: 44  7-SEP-17 14:55
494 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:451
Transparency in ratings can ameliorate information asymmetry in
the securitization process. While the critiques of the issuer-pays model
run the gamut, standardization allows investors to learn and under-
stand when to question ratings assessment results.227 The industry-
wide disclosure standards recently adopted by the SEC make it easier
for investors to understand credit ratings.228 Previous SEC credit rat-
ings rules have presumed that investors are sophisticated institutions.
However, unsophisticated individual investors regularly avail them-
selves of mutual funds and pensions funds.229 These investors need
certifications of investment-grade ratings to feel confident enough to
participate in the market.
Credit rating agencies must independently verify and assess an
offering’s compliance with fair lending and consumer protection laws.
As discussed above, banks used a business model to locate the riskiest
loans in neighborhoods that were traditionally denied credit, many of
which were discriminatory. The credit ratings indicated that these
loans were investment grade because no independent verification un-
covered the fact that these loans violated fair lending laws. While
credit rating agencies might not be able to detect the disparate impact
of discriminatory lending on homeowners, they might be able to detect
a pattern of lending that is discriminatory and deleterious to borrow-
ers and investors.
Achieving this level of borrower and investor protection requires
an expansion of the regulatory landscape beyond the SEC’s current
reforms. Rating agencies’ effective supervision of issuers and enforce-
ment of the “government-sponsored entity” (GSE) rules would ensure
that prime and subprime markets achieve the goals of mortgage
securitization, including liquidity, financial stability, and affordable fi-
nancing. The GSE representation and warranty framework prohibits
227. Hill, supra note 41, at 60–62 (presenting three solutions for future enforcement:
creating incentives against herding behavior by investors; functioning as a gatekeeper;
and imposing individual liability on top managers).
228. The Dodd-Frank Act amended the Exchange Act to provide that the SEC shall
require NRSROs to publicly disclose information about their initial credit ratings and
subsequent changes to the credit ratings to allow users of credit ratings to evaluate the
accuracy and compare the performance of credit ratings across NRSROs. Public dis-
closure is also required of NRSRO Credit Rating Histories, NRSRO Credit Rating
Methodologies, and certain qualitative and quantitative information about the credit
rating and certifications from providers of third-party due diligence services with re-
spect to asset backed securities. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 232, 240, 249 & 249b (2014).
229. Assets managed by mutual funds between 1990 and 2006 increased 14.35%
annually. Pension funds increased from $5,086.3 billion in 1994 to $14,027.6 billion
in 2007. See Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in
The New Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 348–49 (2008).
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purchase of loans that fail to comply with federal and state regula-
tions. An issuer’s non-compliance with lending laws triggers the
GSE’s requirement for the original lender to repurchase the noncomp-
liant loans;230 a repurchase would affect the investors’ expected in-
come from the loan pool as well. Credit rating agencies should
confirm whether the loans offered in the loan pool comply with fed-
eral and state laws before issuing ratings, as this practice can prevent
originators from passing economic risks onto issuers and investors.
It is crucial to certify that the information going into ratings mod-
els is credible. Currently, rating agencies are not required to substanti-
ate the information given to them by issuers. Not only does this mean
that the credit agency is not exercising independent judgment and is
relying solely on the issuer, but it also means that the issued rating
could be flawed. Substantive review of the content of the information
used in rating models is imperative to an accurate, efficient assessment
of the securities.231
Legal protection of the ratings is another reason to require credit
agency due diligence. Courts have willingly protected the opinions of
rating agencies as financial publishers under the First Amendment.232
Traditionally, challenges to substantive content of a rating were pro-
tected under the First Amendment due to the manner in which rating
agency opinions are formed and the public context of the information.
Specifically, courts would look at four factors: whether rating agen-
cies (1) rate debt that they are not paid to rate; (2) distribute the ratings
through their publications; (3) have independence in gathering and
evaluating information used for the rating; and (4) fulfill the general
public function of providing information to the financial market.233
This judicial buffer for credit ratings and the agencies that provide
them presumes both a substantive and deliberative process that has a
public benefit. The independence and public function elements of the
ratings protection test strengthen market confidence and ensure rating
agencies act as gatekeepers.234 Dodd-Frank limits rating agency liabil-
230. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac Launch New Representation and Warranty Framework, Increased Transparency
and Certainty for Lenders (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24366/Reps
%20and%20Warrants%20Release%20and%20FAQ%20091112.pdf.
231. MADS ANDENAS & IRIS H-Y CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE OF FINAN-
CIAL REGULATION: GOVERNANCE FOR RESPONSIBILITY 212–213 (1st ed. Routledge
2013).
232. See Jones, supra note 47, at 209–220.
233. In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 583–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
234. In Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Services,
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused
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ity to negligence.235 However, a court may not protect a rating agency
from liability if the agency lacks independence or cooperates with is-
suers to structure the debt.236 In order to receive protection for ratings
failures, the ratings agencies should have a neutral, objective rating
process and make ratings available to a significant number of inves-
tors.237 Mandatory independent due diligence under the issuer-pays
model can make rating reports unbiased and protect rating agencies
from liability.
Finally, the need for due diligence is also justified by past credit
rating failings. Both the SEC and supporters of the issuer-pays model
contend that the reputational capital helps rating agencies resist pres-
sures from originators and issuers to provide unwarranted positive rat-
ings. The SEC’s position that the “very sophisticated rating models”
were accurate predictors of risk and payment is now widely dis-
puted.238 This view that reputational capital was a check on the ratings
process depends on how widely information about a firm is dissemi-
nated;239 it was also inconsistent with the reality that credit ratings
functioned poorly and harmed investors and the public at large.240 As
argued below, third-party due diligence is in the public interest.
to classify the ratings as protected First Amendment speech because the distribution of
the information was limited to subscribers.
235. Section 933 extends liability for private securities fraud actions under Section
15E of the Exchange Act to NRSROs. The plaintiff must plead with particularity that
the defendant NRSRO knowingly or recklessly failed to conduct a reasonable investi-
gation or obtain reasonable verification of the factual elements used in reaching its
conclusions about credit risk. See Dodd-Frank §§ 932(a), 933(a), 934, 935 (2010).
236. In re Fitch, 330 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2003); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.,
Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2008); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. &
“ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 820 (S.D. Tex. 2005), aff’d, 446 F.3d 585 (5th
Cir. 2006).
237. As one court said, there “is no automatic, blanket, absolute First Amendment
protection for reports.” In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
238. Cf. David J. Reiss, Ratings Failure: The Need for a Consumer Protection
Agenda in Rating Agency Regulation, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Nov.
2009, at 12, 16 (proposing that credit rating agencies use licensing process similar to
broadcast license renewals which invites public comment on the services provided).
239. See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1613–15
(2010) (arguing that protecting reputational capital may not be an objective shared by
individual workers).
240. See Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 749, 812 (2013) (cataloguing the “numerous empirical studies documented the
failures of rating agencies); see, e.g., Adam Ashcraft et al., MBS Ratings and the
Mortgage Credit Boom 23–24 tbl.3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No.
449, 2010) (documenting a pattern of stability in high ratings in spite of declines in
diligence of and asset quality in mortgage-backed securities from 2001 to 2008);
Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings, 56 J.
MONETARY ECON. 617, 624–28, 632–33 (2009) (criticizing the lax process for credit
rating of CDOs and the conflicts of interest created by the hiring of rating agencies by
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C. Independent Credit Ratings and the Public Good
Congress is well aware of the public regulatory function that
credit rating agencies perform in financial markets.241 However, these
agencies are not held accountable for whether or not they serve the
public.242 Maintaining the issuer-pays model requires further changes
to the practices of credit rating agencies.
It is not certain whether the proposed changes to the credit ratings
process will benefit borrowers whose communities were forever
changed by predatory lending. Investors should have information
about the profitability of the securities, while borrowers should re-
ceive a loan with fair terms. Admittedly, borrowers whose homes col-
lateralize mortgage securities are not the intended third-party
issuers); Allen Ferrell et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the
2007–2008 Credit Crisis, in PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED: SECURITIZATION AFTER
THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 163–235 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2009) (docu-
menting the stability of ratings in spite of marked decline in the extent of diligence
into and quality of the underlying mortgages in mortgage-backed securities from 2001
to 2006).
241. See the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109–291, 120 Stat. 1327
(2006). The statute gave the SEC the power to regulate NRSRO internal processes
regarding record-keeping and how they guard against conflicts of interest, and specifi-
cally makes the NRSRO determination subject to a Commission vote. The law specif-
ically prohibits the SEC from regulating an NRSRO’s rating methodologies. The
Commission does however, have the authority to implement a registration and over-
sight program for NRSROs and to require recordkeeping, reporting, and examination
authority over NRSROs. Credit rating agencies are a “convenient surrogate.” As
stated by one SEC Commissioner:
During the past thirty years, regulators such as the Commission have in-
creasingly used credit ratings as a convenient surrogate for the measure-
ment of risk in assessing investments held by regulated entities.
Specifically, since 1975, the Commission has referenced the ratings of
specified rating agencies in certain of its regulations under the federal
securities laws. These rating agencies are often referred to as “Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” or “NRSROs.”
The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. Securities Markets: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 2002 WL 444385 (S.E.C.) (2002) (statement
of Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission) [hereinafter
2002 Hearings].
242. For example, although credit rating agencies did not did not consider Enron a
credit risk until four days before its bankruptcy, they were not found responsible be-
cause the ratings are considered opinions rather than expert advice. See, e.g., In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex.
2005) (holding that credit rating agencies are entitled to First Amendment protections
against lender’s claims regarding negligent misrepresentation of debtor’s creditworthi-
ness); see also Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank
Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1307 (2011) (criticizing Dodd-
Frank’s provisions that rating agencies have a “gatekeeper” role in the debt market
equivalent to that of securities brokers).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-2\NYL203.txt unknown Seq: 48  7-SEP-17 14:55
498 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:451
beneficiaries of credit ratings and offerings disclosures. However,
credit ratings are designed to encourage a strong market, which can
maintain its operation only when all market participants, including
borrowers, are equipped with appropriate safeguards.243
Moreover, the evidence of opportunistic securitization discussed
above presents a strong challenge to a laissez-fare theory of credit
rating agency regulation. The argument based on that theory suggests
that opportunistic behavior was an aberration in financial markets; and
that the market possessed the requisite information and expertise to
recognize and reject issuer and originator misconduct. The theory con-
cludes that originators and issuers already had “incentives to maintain
transparency and protect their reputations.”244 The existence of rules
prohibiting discriminatory lending undercuts this argument. This par-
ticular instance reflects the need for strong enforcement of those laws.
The availability of credit became almost unlimited in neighborhoods
that had previously been redlined; minority borrowers overwhelm-
ingly received loans with relatively worse terms, such as subprime
loans when they in fact qualified for prime loans.245 Foreclosure dis-
proportionately affected minority homeowners and neighborhoods.246
These facts make for a strong argument that discrimination in lending
continues to be a significant concern. Furthermore, vigilant monitor-
ing in all stages of the lending process, including sale in secondary
markets, is required.
Finally, two separate but converging functions of credit reporting
agencies—the gatekeeping function and the public service function—
support the notion that rating agencies should conduct due diligence.
The SEC has delegated to NRSROs the function of assessing the via-
bility of securities offerings, and has given them a “quasi-public re-
sponsibility.”247 If rating agencies did not perform this function, the
243. While credit ratings do not protect individual investors, optimally they en-
courage investment and in that way serve a consumer protection function. Macey,
supra note 133. Although the rating agencies have a “quasi-public responsibilities,”
the ratings do not “represent a ‘seal of approval’ of a federal regulatory agency.” See
2002 Hearings, supra note 241, at 2, 5 (statement of Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. R
Securities & Exchange Commission).
244. Fligstein, supra note 179, at 4.
245. Charles L. Nier, III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis: Rethink-
ing the Theory of Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending Under the Fair
Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 941, 942 (2011) (describing the subprime crisis as
“reverse redlining”).
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SEC would perform such a function in order to maintain investor con-
fidence and support the market. The SEC currently requires rating
agencies to disclose any due diligence performed by a third-party.248
Yet, in 2002, the SEC disagreed with rating agencies on their indepen-
dent review of information supplied by issuers.249 The SEC then rec-
ommended that the rating agencies “explore whether NRSROs should
incorporate general standards of diligence in performing their ratings
analysis.”250
The increasing complexity of financial products requires that the
market be protected from opinions based on limited and biased infor-
mation. In reaction to this, the SEC has delegated a public duty to
protect market participants, including investors and borrowers.
CONCLUSION
The financial crisis compelled a close-examination of the estab-
lished credit rating system. Credit rating agencies are critical to the
efficient operation of banking and finance markets. Both investors and
the market benefit from the meaningful quantitative analysis provided
by rating agencies.
This Article argued that, because credit rating agencies perform a
quasi-public regulatory function, they should protect investors. Credit
ratings have the broad purpose of protecting the market by serving as
a check on the originating lenders’ screening and monitoring of bor-
rowers. In the secondary mortgage market, where borrowers heavily
depend on securitization, borrowers indirectly rely on the accuracy
and credibility of credit ratings.
This Article argued that Dodd-Frank’s credit rating agency re-
forms are flawed because they fail to address the conflict of interest in
the issuer-pays model. It discussed how Dodd-Frank’s reforms—the
ability to pay, risk retention, qualified mortgage, and credit rating
agency disclosure rules—do not address flawed ratings based on issu-
248. See Final Rule, Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR §§ 232, 240, 249, and 249b Release No. 34-
72936, 327 (10/14/2014).
249. The Report noted:
The rating agencies tend to have a more limited view of their role in
verifying information reviewed in the credit rating process. In general, the
rating agencies state that they rely on issuers and other sources to provide
them with accurate and complete information. They typically do not audit
the accuracy or integrity of issuer information.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agen-
cies in the Operation of the Securities Markets As Required by Section 702(b) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 26 (2003).
250. Id.
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ers’ data. Leaving the issuer-pays model in place may work well for
the most sophisticated investors, but it does little to provide the pro-
tections that the rest of the market, such as investors and borrowers,
needs. The Article explained that the rising prices during the housing
bubble heightened the informational asymmetry in mortgage securi-
tization. Credit rating agencies have an obligation to provide an objec-
tive, neutral, and independent assessment of securities’ projected
performance. The models used to project the performance data are
meaningless if they are simply an aggregate of information provided
by the most conflicted parties—the originating lender and the issuer.
Borrowers and investors’ common interest in sustainable mort-
gage financing under the present model is overlooked. The structural
flaws and inherent conflict of interest in the issuer-pays model al-
lowed some participants in the subprime securitization process to
maximize their profits. Furthermore, without the safeguards that credit
rating agencies could have provided, securitization, which provides
numerous advantages and works efficiently in many other market sec-
tors, became a tool for abusive and discriminatory lending.
The SEC’s recent reform—mandating the disclosure of third-
party reports given to the credit rating agency—is important, but does
nothing more than make information accessible available. It does not
eliminate the dangers that the issuer-pays model poses and merely
shows how the regulations emerging from the reforms are biased to-
ward the credit rating agencies. This article proposed an alternative
approach—credit rating agency due diligence—that aims for unbiased
ratings. This reform would produce balanced and disinterested credit
ratings, increasing transparency in the rating process. Such a reform
would create a more informed market, better protect investors and
serve the public interest in having secure, affordable housing
financing.
